The Reading Selection from Ethics

[Emotivism: Is Ethics Based on Feelings?]

Now this question as to whether one and the same action can ever be both right and wrong at the same time, or can ever be right at one time and wrong at another, is, I think, obviously, an extremely fundamental one. If we decide it in the affirmative, then a great many of the questions which have been most discussed by ethical writers are at once put out of court. It must, for instance, be idle to discuss what characteristic there is, which universally distinguishes right actions from wrong ones, if this view be true. If one and the same action can be both right and wrong then obviously there can be no such characteristic—there can be no characteristic which always belongs to right actions, and never to wrong ones…

I propose, therefore, first of all, to raise the simple issue: Can one and the same action be both right and wrong, either at the time or at different times? …

It may be held, namely, that whenever we assert that an action or class of actions is right or wrong, we must be merely making an assertion about somebody's feelings towards the action or class of actions in question. This is a view which seems to be very commonly held in some form or other; and one chief reason whiy it is held is, I think, that many people seem to find an extreme difficulty in seeing what else we possibly can mean by the words "right" and "wrong," except that some mind or set of minds have some feeling, or some other mental attitude, towards the actions to which we apply these predicates.…

To begin with, it may be held that whenever any man asserts an action to be right or wrong, what he is asserting is merely that he himself has some particular feeling towards the action in question. Each of us, according to this view, is merely making an assertion about his own feelings: when I assert that an action is right, the whole of what I mean is merely that I have some particular feeling towards the action; and when you make the same assertion, the whole of what you mean is merely that you have the feeling in question towards the action. …

But whatever view be taken as to the precise nature of the feelings about which we are supposed to be making a judgment, any view which holds that, when we call an action right or wrong, each of us is always merely asserting that he himself has or has not some particular feeling toward it, does, I think inevitably lead to the same conclusion—namely, that quite often one and the same action is both right and wrong; and any such view is also exposed to one and the same fatal objection.

The argument which shows that such views inevitably lead to the conclusion that one and the same action is quite often both right and wrong, consists of two steps, each of which deserves to be separately emphasized.

The first is this. If, whenever I judge an action to be right, I am merely judging that I myself have a particular feeling towards it, then it plainly follow that, provided I really have the feeling in question, my judgment is true, and therefore the action in question really is right. And what is true of me, in this respect, will also be true of any other man. No matter what we suppose the feeling to be, it must be true that , whenever and so long as any man really has towards any action the feeling in question, then, and for just so long, the action in question really is right. For what our theory supposes is that, when a man judges an action to be right, he is merely judging that he has this feeling toward it; and hence, whenever he really has it, his judgment must be true, and the action really must be right. It strictly follows, therefore, from this theory that whenever any man whatever really has a particular feeling towrds an action, the action really is right; and whenever any man whatever really has another particular feeling towards an action, the action really is wrong. …

And now, if we take into account a second fact, it seems plainly to follow that, if this be so, one and the same action must quite often be both right and wrong.

This second fact is merely the observed fact, which it seems difficult to deny, that, whatever pair of feelings or single feeling we take, cases do occur in which two different men have opposite feelings towards the same action, and in which, while one has a given feeling towards an action, the other has not got it. …

But still, if we look at the extraordinary differences that there have been and are between different races of mankind, and in different stages of society, in respect of the classes of actions which have been regarded as right and wrong, it is, I think, scarcely possible to doubt that in some societies, actions have been regarded with actual feelings of positive moral approval, towards which many of us would feel the strongest disapproval. And if this is so with regard to classes of actions, it can hardly fail to be sometimes the case with regard to particular actions. We may, for instance, read of a particular action, which excites in s a strong feeling of moral disapproval; and yet it can hardly be doubted that sometimes this very action will have been regarded by some of the men among whom it was done, without any feeling of disapproval whatever, and even with a feeling of positive approval. But, if this be so, then, on the view we are considering, it will absolutely follow that whereas it was true then, when it was done, that that action was right, it is true now that the very same action was wrong.

And once we admit that there have been such real differences of feeling between men in diffrent stages of society, we must also, I think, admit that such differences do quite often exist even among contemporaries, when they are members of very different societies; so that one and the same action may be quite often be at the same time both right and wrong. And, having admitted this, we ought, I think, to go still further. Once we are convinced that real differences of feeling towards certain classes of actions, and not merely differences of opinion, do exist between men in different states of society, the probability is that when two men in the same state of society differ in opinion as to whether an action is right or wrong, this difference of opinion, though it by no means always indicates a corresponding difference of feeling, yet sometimes really is accompanied by such a difference: so that two members of the same society may really sometimes have opposite feelings towards one and the same action, whatever feeling we take. And finally, we must admit, I think, that even one and the same individual may experience such a change of feeling towards one and the same action. A man certainly does often come to change his opinion as to whether a particular action was right or wrong; and we must, I think, admit that, sometimes at least, his feelings towards it completely change as well; so that, for instance, an action, which he formerly regarded with moral disapproval, he may now regard with positive moral approval, and vice versa. So that, for this reason alone, and quite apart from differences of feeling between different men, we shall have to admit, according to our theory, that it is often now true of an action that it was right, although it was formerly true of the same action that it was wrong. …

Can it possibly be the case then, that, when we judge an action to be right or wrong, each of us is only asserting that he himself has some particular feeling toward it? …

If, when one man says, "This action is right," and another answers, "No, it is not right," each of them is always merely making an assertion about his own feelings, it plainly follws that there is never really any difference of opinion between them: the one of them is never really contradicting what the other is asserting. They are no more contradicting one another than if, when one had said, "I like sugar," the other had answered, "I don't like sugar." In such a case, there is of course, no conflict of opinion, no contradiction of one by the other for it may perfectly well be the case that what each asserts is equally true; it may quite well be the case that the one man really does like sugar, and the other really does not like it. The one, therefore is never denying what the other is asserting. And what the view we are considering involves is that when one man holds an action to be right, and another holds it to be wrong or not right, here also the one is never denying what the other is asserting. It involves, therefore, the very curious consequence that no two men can ever differ in opinion as to whether an action is right or wrong. And surely the fact that it involves this consequence is sufficent to condemn it. It is surely plain matter of fact that when I assert an action to be wrong, and another man asserts it to be right, there sometimes is a real difference of opinion between us: he sometimes is denying the very thing which I am asserting. But, if this is so, then it cannot possibly be the case that each of us is merely making a judgment about his own feelings; since two such judgments never can contradict one another. …

[I]t is sometimes the case that both men may use the word "right" to denote exactly the same predicate, and that the one may really be thinking that the action in question really has this predicate, while the other is thinking that it has not got it. But if this is so, then the theory we are considerng certainly is not true. It cannot be true that every man always denotes by the word "right" merely a relation to his own feelings, since, if that were so, no two men would ever denote by this word the same predicate; and hence a man who said that an action was not right could never be denying that it has the very predicate, which another, who said that it was right, was asserting that it had. …

If we once clearly see that to say that an action is right is not the same thing as to say that we have any feeling towards it, what reason is there left for holding that the presence of a certain feeling is, in fact, always a sign that it is right? No one, I think, would be very much tempted to assert that the mere presence (or absence) of a certain feeling is invariably a sign of rightness, but for the supposition that, in some way or other, the only possible meaning of the word "right," as applied to actions, is that somebody has a certain feeling towards them. And it is this supposition, in one of its forms, that our argument does disprove. …

[Is Ethics Based on What Society Thinks?]

Many people have such a strong disposition to believe that when we judge an action to be right or wrong we must be merely making an assertion about the feelings of some man of set of men…that each man, when he asserts an action to be right or wrong, is merely asserting that a certain feeling is generally felt towards actions of that class by most of the members of the society to which he belongs…

From either of these two views, it will, of course, follow that one and the same action is often both right and wrong, for the same reasons as were given in the last case. Thus, if, when I, assert an action to be right, I am merely asserting that it is generally approved in the society to which I belong, it follows, of course, that if it is generally approved by my society, my assertion is true, and the action really is right. But as we say, it seems undeniable, that some actions which are generally approved in my society, will have been disapproved or will still be disapproved in other societies. And, since any member of one of those societies will, on this view. when he judges an action to be wrong, be merely judging that it is disapproved in his society, though appproved in mine, to be wrong, this judgement of his will be just as true as my judgment that the same action was right: and hence the same action really will be both right and wrong. And similarly, if we adopt the other alternative, and say that when a man judges an action to be right he is merely judging that some man or other has a particular feeling toward it, it will, of course, follow that whenever any man at all really has this feeling towards it, the action really is right, while, whenever any man at all has not got it or has an opposite feeling, the action really is wrong; and, since cases will certainly occur in which one man has the requred feeling, while another has an opposite one towards the same action, in all such cases the same action will be both right and wrong. …

For, whatever feeling or feelings we take as the ones about which he is supposed to be judging, it is quite certain that a man may think an action to be right, even when he does not think that the members of his society have in general the required feeling (or absence of feeling) towards it; and that similarly he may doubt whether an action is right, even when he does not doubt that some man or other has the required feeling towards it. Cases of this kind certainly constantly occur, and what they prove is that, whatever a man is thinking when he thinks an action to be right, he is certainly not merely thinking that his society has in general a particular feeling toward it; and similarly that, when he is in doubt as to whether an action is right, the question about which he is in doubt is not merely as to whether any man at all has the required feeling towards it. Facts of this kind are, therefore, absolutely fatal to both of these two theories; whereas in the case of the theory that he is merely making a judgement about his own feelings, it is not so obvious that there are any facts of the same kind inconsistent with it. For here it might be urged with some plausibility (though, I think, untruly) that when a man judges an action to be right he always does think that he himself has some particular feeling towards it; and similarly that when he is in doubt as to whether an action is right he always is in doubt as to his own feelings. but it cannot possibly be urged, with any plausibility at all, that when a man judges an action to be right he always thinks, for instance, that it is generally approved in his society; or that when he is in doubt, he is always in doubt as to whether any man approves it. He may know quite well that somebody does approve it, and yet be in doubt whether it is right; and he may be quite certain that his society does not approve it, and yet still think that it is right. And the same will hold, whatever feeling we take instead of moral approval.

These facts, then, seem to me to prove conclusively that, when a man judges an action to be right or wrong, he is not always merely judging that his society hyas some particular feeling towards actions of that class, nor yet that some man does. …

[Is Ethics Sociologically Based?]

It has been widely held that, in the history of the human race, judgments of right and wrong originated in the fact that primitive men or their non-human ancestors had certain feelings towards certain classes of actions. That is to say, it is supposed that there was a time, if we go far enough back, when our ancestors did have different feelings towards different actions, being, for instance, pleased with some and displeased with others, but when they did not, as yet, judge any actions to be right or wrong; and that it was only because they transmitted these feelings, more or less modified, to their descendants, that those descendants at some later stage, began to make judgements of right and wrong; so that, in a sense, our moral judgments were developed out of mere feelings. And I can see no objection to the supposition that this was so. But, then, it seems also to be often supposed that, if our moral judgements were developed out of feeling—if this was their origin—they must still at this moment be somehow concerned with feelings: that the developed product must resemble the germ out of which it was developed in this particular respect. And this is an assumption for which there is, surely, no shadow of ground. …

And hence the theory that moral judgments originated in feelings does not, in fact, lend any support at all to the theory that now, as developed, they can only be judgments about feelings. No argument from the origin of a thing can be a safe guide as to exactly what the nature of the thing is now.[1] That is a question which must be settled by actual analysis of the thing in its present state. And such analysis seems plainly to show that moral judgements are not merely judgments about feelings.

I conclude, then that the theory that our judgments of right and wrong are merely judgments about somebody's feeling is quite untenable in any of the forms in which it will lead to the conclusion that one and the same action is often both right and wrong. …

[Relativism: Is Ethics Based on What People Think?]

[A] second theory is one which is often confused with the one just considered. It consists in aserting that when we judge an action to be right or wrong what we are asserting is merely that somebody or other thinks it to be right or wrong. That is to say, just as the last theory asserted that our moral judgements are merely judgements about somebody's feelings, this one asserts that they are merely judgments about somebody's thoughts or opinions.…

If, for instance, when I say that an action is right, all that I mean is that I think it to be right, it will follow, that, if I do really think it to be right, my judgement that I think so will be true; and since this judgment is supposed to be identical with the judgement that it is right, it will follow that the judgement that it is right is true and hence that the action really is right. And since it is even more obvious that different men's opinions as to whether a given action is right or wrong differ both at the same time and at different times, than that their feelings towards the same action differ, it wil follow that one and the same action very often is both right and wrong. … Thus, in its first form, it will involve the absurdity that no two men ever differ in opinion as to whether an action is right or wrong, and will thus contradict a plain fact. While in the other two forms, it will involve the conclusions that no man ever thinks a action to be right, unless he thinks that his society thinks it to be right, and that no man ever doubts whether an action is right, unless he doubts whether any man at all thinks it right—two conclusions which are both of them certinly untrue.

These objections are, I think, sufficient by themselves to dispose of this theory as of the last…