|Readings in the History of Ęsthetics: An Open-Source Reader; Ver. 0.11|
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Compose a refutation of ęsthetic relativism, a view described by Hume as "the principle of the equality of tastes":
All sentiment is right, because sentiment has a reference to nothing beyond itself, and is always real, wherever a man is conscious of it.
Would Hume agree with the common belief of de gustibus non est disputandum? What arguments does he present with respect to this cliché.
In this reading, Hume claims that ęsthetic sentiment and judgment are improved through proper experience and education. How could he distinguish between a proper artistic education and a training which produces a prejudicial view—i.e., one not in accordance with the universal principles of beauty?
Explain why Hume's argument to the conclusion "the best way of ascertaining [a delicacy of taste] is to appeal to those models and principles which have been established by the uniform consent and experience of nations and ages" is not the fallacy of Argumnetum ad Populum. Nevertheless, state several good objections to his criterion of good taste.
Hume believes that principles of taste are uniform in nature, given some variations. Clarify this view. Does he mean general principles of taste are universal ceteris paribus, or does he mean general principles of taste are similar from culture to culture?