“Conscience Is Learned” by Alexander Bain

Table of Contents

I Ideas of Interest from Moral Science ............................................................... 2
The Reading Selection from Moral Science ...................................................... 2
Related Ideas ........................................................................................................ 6
Topics Worth investigating ............................................................................. 7
Index .................................................................................................................. 12

About the author...

Alexander Bain (1818-1903) was self-educated until he entered Marischal College in Aberdeen Scotland. With his submission of an article to the Westminster Review, he became acquainted with John Stuart Mill and was drawn into utilitarianism and empiricism. As one of the founders of British psychology, he sought to explain all mental processes in terms of physical sensations and rid psychology of metaphysical hypotheses. His books The Senses and the Intellect (1855) and The Emotions and the Will (1859) were standard textbooks in psychology well into the next century. Bain founded the psychological journal Mind in 1876—today it’s a well-known philosophy journal.
About the work...

In his *Moral Science*, Bain uses his insight into the nature of the will for an explication of ethical theory. In many ways, Bain anticipated pragmatism; in fact, Charles Sanders Pierce’s well-known statement, “different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise” originated from Bain’s notion of belief as the preparation to act. In the brief selection below, he explains the origin of conscience and how our consciences are shaped. If Bain is correct, conscience cannot be a reliable guide to a consistent ethics across different cultures and during different times.

From the reading...

“Still more striking is the growth of a moral sentiment in connexion with such usages as the Hindoo suttee. It is known that the Hindoo widow, if prevented from burning herself with her husband’s corpse, often feels all the pangs of remorse, and leads a life of misery and self-humiliation.”

Ideas of Interest from *Moral Science*

1. How does Bain define “conscience”? Is his definition congruent with the contemporary use of the word?
2. According to Bain, how are the emotions and self-interest related to conscience?
3. How is conscience shaped by education, law, and authority? Explain what Bain means by the “effect of contiguous association”?
4. According to Bain how does conscience develop in children who were neglected by their parents?
5. Does Bain distinguish between the mores and the morals of a society? What reasons does he provide for his judgment?

The Reading Selection from *Moral Science*

**[Nature of Conscience]**

It may be proved, by such evidence as the case admits of, that the peculiarity of the Moral Sentiment, or Conscience, is identified with our education under government, or Authority.

Conscience is described by such terms as moral approbation and disapprobation; and involves, when highly developed, a peculiar and unmistakable revulsion of mind at what is wrong, and a strong resentment towards the wrong-doer, which become Remorse, in the case of self.

It is capable of being proved, that there is nothing natural or primitive in these feelings, except in so far as the case happens to concur with the dictates of Self-interest, or Sympathy, aided by the Emotions formerly specified. Any action that is hostile to our interest, excites a form of disapprobation, such as belongs to wounded self-interest; and any action that puts another to pain may so affect our natural sympathy as to be disapproved, and resented on that ground. These natural or inborn feelings are always liable to coincide with moral right and wrong, although they are not its criterion or measure in the mind of each individual. But in those cases where an unusually strong feeling of moral disapprobation is awakened, there is apt to be a concurrence of the primitive motives of self, and of fellow-feeling; and it is the ideal of good law, and good morality, to coincide with a certain well-proportioned adjustment of the Prudential and the Sympathetic regards of the individual.

The requisite allowance being made for the natural impulses, we must now adduce the facts, showing that the characteristic of the Moral Sense is an education under Law, or Authority, through the instrumentality of Punishment.

**[Conscience Formed by Association]**

(1) It is a fact that human beings living in as formation of society are placed under discipline, accompanied by punishment. Certain actions are forbidden, and the doers of them are subjected to some painful infliction; which is increased in severity, if they are persisted in. Now, what would be, the natural consequence of such a system, under the known laws of feeling, will, and intellect? Would not an action that always brings down punishment be associated with the pain and the dread of punishment? Such an association is inevitably formed, and becomes at least a part, and a very important part, of the sense of duty; nay, it would of itself, after a certain amount of repetition,
be adequate to restrain for ever the performance of the action, thus attaining
the end of morality.

There may be various ways of evoking and forming the moral sentiment,
but the one way most commonly trusted to, and never altogether dispensed
with, is the associating of pain, that is, punishment, with the actions that
are disallowed. Punishment is held out as the consequence of performing
certain actions; every individual is made to taste of it; its infliction is one of
the most familiar occurrences of every-day life. Consequently, whatever else
may be present in the moral sentiment, this fact of the connexion of pain
with forbidden actions must enter into it with an overpowering prominence. Any
natural or primitive impulse in the direction of duty must be very marked
and apparent, in order to divide with this communicated bias the direction
of our conduct. It is for the supporters of innate distinctions to point out
any concurring impetus (apart from the Prudential and Sympathetic regards)
sufficiently important to cast these powerful associations into a secondary or
subordinate position.

From the reading…

“The constant habit of regarding with dread the consequences of vio-
lating any of the rules, simulates a moral sentiment, on a subject un-
connected with morality properly so called.”

By a familiar effect of Contiguos Association, the dread of punishment
clothes the forbidden act with a feeling of aversion, which in the end
persists of its own accord, and without reference to the punishment. Actions
that have long been connected in the mind with pains and penalties, come to
be contemplated with a disinterested repugnance; they seem to give pain on
their own account. This is a parallel, from the side of pain, of the acquired
attachment to money. Now, when, by such transference, a self-subsisting senti-
ment of aversion has been created, the conscience seems to be detached from
all external sanctions, and to possess an isolated footing in the mind. It has
passed through the stage of reference to authority, and has become a law to
itself. But no conscience ever arrives at the independent standing, without
first existing in the reflected and dependent stage.

We must never omit from the composition of the Conscience the primary
impulses of Self-Interest and Sympathy, which in minds strongly alive to one
or other, always count for a powerful element in human conduct, although for
reasons already stated, not the strictly moral element, so far as the individual
is concerned. They are adopted, more or less, by the authority imposing the
moral code; and when the two sources coincide, the stream is all the stronger.

(2) Where moral training is omitted or greatly neglected, there is an absence
In no civilized community is moral discipline entirely wanting. Although children may be neglected by their parents, they come at last under the discipline of the law and the public. They cannot be exempted from the associations of punishment with wrong. But when these associations have not been early and sedulously formed, in the family, in the school, and in the workshop, the moral sentiment is left in a feeble condition. There still remain the force of the law and of public opinion, the examples of public punishment, and the reprobation of guilt. Every member of the community must witness daily the degraded condition of the viciously disposed, and the prosperity following on respect for the law. No human being escapes from thus contracting moral impressions to a very large amount.

(3) Whenever an action is associated with Disapprobation and Punishment, there grows up, in reference to it, a state of mind undistinguishable from Moral Sentiment.

There are many instances where individuals are enjoined to a course of conduct wholly indifferent with regard to universal morality, as in the regulations of societies formed for special purposes. Each member of the society has to conform to these regulations, under pain of forfeiting all the benefits of the society, and of perhaps incurring positive evils. The code of honour among gentlemen is an example of these artificial impositions. It is not to be supposed that there should be an innate sentiment to perform actions having nothing to do with moral right and wrong; yet the disapprobation and the remorse following on a breach of the code of honour, will often be greater than what follows a breach of the moral law. The constant habit of regarding with dread the consequences of violating any of the rules, simulates a moral
sentiment, on a subject unconnected with morality properly so called.

The arbitrary ceremonial customs of nations, with reference to such points as ablutions, clothing, eating and abstinence from meats,—when rendered obligatory by the force of penalties, occupy exactly the same place in the mind as the principles of moral right and wrong. The same form of dread attaches to the consequences of neglect; the same remorse is felt by the individual offender. The exposure of the naked person is as much abhorred as telling a lie. The Turkish woman exposing her face, is no less conscience-smitten than if she murdered her child. There is no act, however trivial, that cannot be raised to the position of a moral act, by the imperative of society.

Still more striking is the growth of a moral sentiment in connexion with such usages as the Hindoo suttee. It is known that the Hindoo widow, if prevented from burning herself with her husband’s corpse, often feels all the pangs of remorse, and leads a life of misery and self-humiliation. The habitual inculcation of this duty by society, the penalty of disgrace attached to its omission, operate to implant a sentiment in every respect analogous to the strongest moral sentiment.

*Marischal College*, where Bain first studied natural philosophy and later, in 1860, when Marischal College became part of the University of Aberdeen, Bain taught logic and literature. (Library of Congress)
Related Ideas

Alexander Bain, *Moral Science: A Compendium of Ethics*[^3] Bain’s 1869 work on ethics presented by the University of Michigan Library as part of the Making of America digital library of primary sources.


From the reading…

“The Turkish woman exposing her face, is no less conscience-smitten than if she murdered her child. There is no act, however trivial, that cannot be raised to the position of a moral act, by the imperative of society.”

Topics Worth Investigating

1. In the reading, Bain associates conscience with “our education under government, or Authority” by means of the instrument of punishment. First, Solomon Asch points out:

   There are acts that we feel we should do, although failure to comply does not involve painful consequences. There are times when we feel we have acted wrongly, although there is no prospect of punishment. The reverse is also the case: we may expect punishment from society without the slightest conviction of wrong. These observations contradict the causal explanations

[^3]: Moral Science: A Compendium of Ethics (http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/textidx?c=moa;idno=AJF1462)
[^4]: “Scottish Philosophy in the 19th Century” (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scottish-19th/)
“Conscience Is Learned” by Alexander Bain

of current behavioristic and psychoanalytic accounts which trace the gene-
sis of obligation to dread of punishment. How do you think Bain would respond to this apparent contradiction of the formation of an “internalized inhibitory process” or conscience? Second, suppose a religious-based government educated children to believe it is morally correct to kill with malice aforethought all persons of a different faith. Would the conscience of citizens in that state then be in approval of an ethically wrong action? How can Bain distinguish arbitrary but obligatory customs from principles of right and wrong? On what basis can he demark the moral sentiment of conscience from the moral sentiment formed by obligatory customs? In this regard, Bain notes, “The constant habit of regarding with dread the consequences of violating any of the rules [of a code of honor], simulates a moral sentiment, on a sub-
ject unconnected with morality properly so called.” Is Bain tacitly distin-
guishing between a (prescriptive) ethics and a (descriptive) morals?

2. In Bain’s goal to unite psychology and physiology, he distanced himself from John Stuart Mill and the utilitarians. He sought to explain men-
tal association in terms of neural connections. Given this background, speculate as to how Bain might conclude that belief is merely “a prepara-
tion to act.” Bain states, “There may be various ways of evoking and forming the moral sentiment, but the one way most commonly trusted to, and never altogether dispensed with, is the associating of pain, that is, punishment, with the actions that are disallowed.” Does Bain’s con-
nection of pain with an associated moral sentiment here anticipate the James-Lange theory of emotion?

3. Bain points out, “We must never omit from the composition of the Con-
science the primary impulses of Self-Interest and Sympathy . . . ” In re-
spect to concurrence with these “natural impulses,” the action of killing infidels would seem to be in accordance with self-interest with no attendant feeling of revulsion, but the action would also seem to conflict with sympathetic regard of the individual with the attendant feeling of revul-
sion. Wouldn’t the natural impulses in such a case not be in complete accordance with conscience?

4. Would Bain’s account of the formation of moral sentiment by means of contiguous association of the pain of punishment with disallowed actions

7. The theory entails emotions result from physiological events rather than causing them. As William James illustrates, “. . . we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble . . . ” James summarizes the theory as “the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as the occur IS the emotion.” William James, The Principles of Psychology (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1913), 2:449-450. The view that some actions are not by their nature the effect of desire is essential to a defense of free will.

8 Philosophy Readings: Article Series
differ in kind or differ in degree from either classical conditioning or operant conditioning of behaviorism? Does Bain anticipate Thorndike’s law of effect?

5. In the last part of his *The Emotions and the Will*, Bain argues for a behavioral determinism. Yet, in his *Moral Science: A Compendium of Ethics* published the same year, he explains the psychological basis of ethics. If determinism is true, how is a science of ethics possible?

6. To what extent would Bain agree or disagree with the following legal characterization of “conscience”:

Conscience is defined to be internal or self-knowledge; the judgment of right and wrong, or the faculty, power, or principle within us which decides on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of actions and affections, and instantly approves or condemns them. Conscience is called by some writers the moral sense, and considered as an ordinary faculty of our nature. *People v. Stewart*, 7 Cal. 140, 143.

First, would Bain agree that law and custom that shape the moral sense or would he agree moral sense shapes law and custom? Second, are the two parts of the judicial definition from *People v. Stewart* logically consistent?

7. The Christian conception of conscience implying devotion to moral law and attention to sacrifice in hope of a further future existence historically developed from the early Greek conception of conscience as shared knowledge and rational conduct to live well. Does the fact that the meaning of conscience changed significantly since the time of the early Greeks imply conscience cannot be an innate faculty? Would such a claim be an instance of the genetic fallacy?


9. “Of several responses made to the same situation, those which are accompanied or closely followed by satisfaction to the animal will, other things being equal, be more firmly connected with the situation, so that, when it recurs, they will be more likely to recur; those which are accompanied or closely followed by discomfort to the animal will, other things being equal, have their connections with that situation weakened, so that, when it recurs, they will be less likely to occur.” Edward Thorndike, *Animal Intelligence* (New York: Macmillan, 1911), 244.

10. “The doctrine that all the facts in the physical universe, and hence also in human history, are absolutely dependent upon and conditioned by their causes. In psychology: the doctrine that the will is not free but determined by psychic or physical conditions.” Dagobert D. Runes, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy* (Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Company, 1942), 78.

8. Bain points out the natural, inborn feelings of self-interest and sympathy do not make moral distinctions but instead these innate feelings often coincide with the ideas of moral law. Do you think Bain regards this connection as an accidental correlation or as a causal connection?

9. Bain’s characterization of conscience is not in strict accord with the modern definition of conscience, taken here, for example, from The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary:

   The internal recognition of the moral quality of one’s motives and actions; the faculty or principle which pronounces upon the moral quality of one’s actions or motives, approving the right and condemning the wrong.15

   In our reading, Bain states conscience involves “a peculiar and unmistakeable revulsion of mind at what is wrong, and a strong resentment towards the wrong-doer . . .”. Would not it follow from his psychology of natural impulses that the resentment towards the wrong-doer be attributable to the natural, innate feelings of self-interest and sympathy rather than to the moral sentiment of conscience? Would not the strong resentment toward a wrongdoer be based on analogical reasoning as if the person were one’s own self rather than based on the immediate effect of one’s conscience?

10. Some religious leaders note that the simple nature of the conscience point to a divine origin, and, as a result, conscience is what sets mankind apart from the rest of the animal kingdom. Yet, historically, the contemporary religious conception of conscience arose from at least three different factors: (1) the cognitive aspect from early Greek thought,13 (2) the emotional aspect from Joseph Butler14 and (3) the remorseful element as a consequence of sin from René Descartes.15 If we assume the biologists and anthropologists are correct in reducing conscience to a natural capacity acquired in the evolutionary prehistory of homo sapiens rather than assume some contemporary religious leaders are correct in supposing conscience to be an innate simple faculty of divine origin, can

---

14. See, for example, Butler’s statement, “This principle in man, by which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions, is conscience; for this is the strict sense of the word . . .” Joseph Butler, Human Nature and Other Sermons (Middlesex: Echo Library, 2006), 6.
15. See, for example, his reference to “repentings and pangs of remorse that usually disturb the consciences of such feeble and uncertain minds . . .” Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method and the Meditations, 1901 ed. John Veitch (New York: Cosimo Publications, 2008), 25.
it still be reasonably argued that, regardless of the origin, human beings

differ from other animals in kind because of their faculty of conscience?

11. Do you think the examples of feral children or “wolf children”, chil-
dren who have grown up without social interaction, would constitute a
definitive counter-example to the belief that conscience is an innate fac-
ulty of human beings? For example, the phenomenologist Anna-Teresa
Tymieniecka writes:

Without initiation into language, feral children remain forever wild, with
untapped human potentialities. In short, then the forms of the establish-
ment of human life, the life of the social animal, naturally speaking, require first
that the human be treated as a human being. Even to begin to realize one’s
human powers, one must be the recipient of gestures which others make,
and one must interpret these intentions on the basis of empathic intuitions.

Most accounts of documented feral children recognize they never fully
develop human capacities. Might not it be argued that just as linguistic
ability is innate but not developed in feral children because of their lack
of human interaction, so also moral ability is innate but not developed
for similar reasons? Might it be that there is an innate or genetically
based sense of fairness in human beings whose particular phenotypical
expression is based on the environment in which the child is reared?

12. Explain why the dictates of conscience are not good grounds for de-
termining ethics whether or not conscience is established religiously or
conscience is established in accordance with developmental psychology.
In both religion and science, a defective conscience or impaired moral
sense can arise similarly: parental neglect, poor education, and peer iso-
lation.

*  

Revision History

Revision 0.7 10.19.10 Revised by: lca

Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this
document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License
(http://www.gnu.org/licenses/fdl.txt), Version 1.2 or any later version
published by the Free Software Foundation. Please send corrections,
comments, or inquiries to “Editors” at

<philhelp@gmail.com>

16. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Manifestations of Reason (Dordrecht,The Netherlands:

Philosophy Readings: Article Series 11
“Conscience Is Learned” by Alexander Bain

Index

Asch, Solomon
  on conscience, 7
associationism, 4, 8
  conscience, 4
Bain, Alexander, 1, 3
  belief
    psychology of, 8
Butler, Joseph
  on conscience, 10
charioteer myth
  Plato, 10
code of honor, 5
conscience
  association, 3
  definition, 10
  definition by Bain, 3
  divine origin, 10
  early Greeks, 9
  emotive theory, 3
  legal definition, 9
Descartes, René
  on conscience, 10
determinism, 9
duty, 3
effect of contiguous association, 4
empiricism, 1
ethics
  rules, 4
feral children, 11
James, William, 8
James-Lange theory of emotion, 8
Mill, John Stuart, 1, 8
morals
  educational and law, 4
  right and wrong, 3
mores, 6
natural feelings, 3
pain
  as punishment, 4
Peirce, Charles Sanders, 2
pragmatism, 2
punishment, 3
self-interest
“Conscience Is Learned” by Alexander Bain

conscience, 3
sympathy, 3
Thorndike, Edward
  law of effect, 9
transference, 4
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 11
utilitarianism, 8