Why doesn't Price think that it is possible for a particular faculty of sense to examine, compare and evaluate sensations?
How does Price distinguish the faculty of sense from the faculty of understanding? Explain Price's use of the terms "sense" and "understanding."
On what basis does Price conclude that our ideas of right and wrong are simple ideas? What is the naturalistic fallacy? How does his argument avoid the naturalistic fallacy?
Explain and give an example of what Price means when he writes, "[T]he understanding is a power of immediate perception, which gives rise to new original ideas." How does Price define intuition? Next, explain why Price believes some of our ideas do not originate entirely from the faculties of sense or understanding.
According to Price, what is the source of the mistake of concluding that our ideas of right and wrong are ideas of sense? Why is this mistake such a serious error? According to Price, what is the role of emotion in the making of ethical judgments?
Price points out sensations are distinct from their causes. In this regard, what is the analogy Price draws between the origin of our ethical ideas and the origin of the the secondary qualities of physical objects?
Explain what this conclusion drawn by Price means: "[N]othing is more common than for men to mistake their own sensations for the properties of the objects producing them, or to apply, to the object itself, what they find always accompanying it, whenever observed." Explain the mistake in terms of the concepts of primary and secondary ideas.
What are Price's three arguments against Hume's claim that "[A]ll our ideas are either impressions or copies of impressions": the first, a reductio ad absurdum, the second, a common sense inquiry into the kinds of impressions, and the third, right and wrong as the necessary nature of some actions.
According to Price, upon what basis can the principles of ethics be absolutely founded? What is his argument that the creation of law or the making of a promise is not an exception to the doctrine of ethical absolutism?
How does Price seek to prove that the source of ethical principles is not God, or even civil authority? According to Price, why can't the will of God determine what is good or bad for human conduct?
Richard Price, Review of the Principal Questions of Morals 3rd. ed. (London: T. Cadell in the Strand, 1787), 8-79 passim.
|The Reading Selection from Review of the Principal Questions of Morals|