October 9 2025 06:55 EDT

Class Debate, Carlisle Indian School LC-USZ62-47083

Class Debate,
Carcilse Indian School,
1879-1918
Library of Congress
LC-USZ62-47083

“The Skylark”
by Samuel Palmer
Etching on Chine Collé 1850
ON 2003.327
The Metropolitian Museum of Art, N.Y.

Introduction to Philosophy

The Principle of Charity

Abstract: The principle of charity in much of philosophy and the sciences is a presumption whereby preconceptions about an argument, a topic, or a theory are set aside in the attempt to seek an understanding of its most cogent exposition. In other fields of study, the formulation of the principle of charity is often contextually subject-dependent.

The Principle of Charity[1] in many areas of the interpretation of discourse is a methodological presumption made in seeking to understand a point of view whereby we seek to understand that view in its best and most cogent form before subjecting the view to evaluation. Often the principle is a means of resolving misunderstanding a speaker's or writer's meaning or ideas while engaged in rational inquiry.
1. The principle of charity is meant to be an integral aspect of interpreting a belief system, point of view, or a standpoint rather than meant as an imposed heuristic principle of rational reconstruction of an opponent's position. (Many criticisms of the traditional principle of charity overlook this prerequisite.) The primary purpose of such a discussion is to seek the the most consistent and true standpoint.
2. While suspending our own beliefs, we seek a sympathetic understanding of the ideas presented.
  1. We assume for the moment the ideas are credible even though our initial reaction might be to disagree; we seek to tolerate ambiguity for the larger aim of understanding ideas which might prove useful and helpful.
  2. Emphasis is placed on seeking to understand rather than on seeking contradictions or difficulties.
  3. Care need be taken to assure key terms are clearly and accurately defined and agreed upon.
3. We seek to understand the ideas in their most convincing form and actively attempt to resolve contradictions. If more than one view is presented, we choose the one that appears the most cogent. However, where possible, the resultant interpretation of the standpoint under investigation must be acknowledged by the speaker as an accurate, fair, and clear re-statement prior to attempted resolution of the issues.
4. The normative use of the principle is meant to apply to discourse where there is a genuine attempt to reach an understanding — and not to persuasive discourse or contests to win an argument or defeat an opponent.
In rhetoric, debate, and persuasion, the use of the principle of charity for accurate, fair, and just resolution of differences by reducing the chances of misrepresenting a point of view or committing straw man fallacy has been criticized on the grounds that seeking the most cogent exposition of an opponent's standpoint will likely misconstrue the opposing position.
1. In popular culture the practice of interpreting the most rational and coherent version of an opponents position is often termed a “steel man” interpretation (as opposed to the straw man fallacy which occurs when an adversary's position is misrepresented and then rejected as if it were the argument at issue).
  1. One common criticism of the use of the principle of charity is the charge that in being “charitable” the initial standpoint or point of view has been misrepresented because the standpoint's meaning or stated belief has been altered in the re-statement.
  2. A related criticism is that the “so called” more rational and cogent “charitable” position is likely to be a case of confirmation bias. The interpreter can be seen as intentionally or unintentionally “misconstruing” the initial standpoint to fit the interpreter's own predispositions.[2]
    
    So, what appears to be rational to the interpreter may not seen as rational to the original speaker. Disagreements like these arise because not everyone shares the same understanding of true belief and legitimate rationality.
  3. These criticisms are sometimes countered by recognizing that the central purpose of rhetorical, forensic, or persuasive discourse is not intended to be truth-seeking — their intent is to alter attitudes and beliefs. That is, the purpose of rhetoric and persuasion is not to find, evaluate, and understand what is true. In the persuasive arts, rhetoric, as the language art of persuasive speaking or writing, is used not for understanding but for the specific purpose of changing attitudes and beliefs.
2. It's important to recognize that the use of the principle of charity in philosophical discourse was never specifically intended to reach consensus,[3] but to achieve knowledge and understanding. Just as a philosopher is unlikely to be in a position to understand algebraic geometry, so also an irrational person is unlikely to understand what makes a good argument.
  
  So, in many fields of controversy, the assumption of something like “equal standing” among disputants might not hold since the disputants might not share a common background of knowledge, a common understanding of rationality, or a belief that inherent bias can be surmounted through open inquiry. Nevertheless, the question of the necessity of “equal standing” for reaching agreement on controversial issues would be an exceedingly difficult precondition to impose for contentious disputes.
The principle of charity, in general, is a methodological principle — ideas can be critiqued after achieving an adequate understanding of the author's intent and standpoint. It's important to point out that the original presumption of setting aside our own beliefs and assuming the standpoint at issue is a substantive and provisional step taken prior to evaluation of the point of view under consideration.
1. Hence, we should initially listen or read new material as if we had no preconceptions about the subject. We seek to be open and receptive.
2. This attitude, if maintained, frees the conditioned mind and enables it to absorb and understand the unfamiliar text.
3. In essence, we just start with a simple desire to grasp any points which might not be understood upon first acquaintance.
4. The method is used in the preparation of a transitional understanding for further inquiry and resolution of the text after a preliminary foundation of agreement.
Refinements of the principle of charity in philosophy include the principle of rational accommodation whereby we attempt to maximize truth and the principle of humanity where we attempt to maximize intelligibility.
1. Willard Van Orman Quine's version of the principle (in the context of understanding a different language) is this maxim of translation: “[A]ssertions startlingly false on the face of them are likely to turn on hidden differences of languages.” The view under examination is necessarily to be assumed to be mostly true.[4] What this means in practice is our own language shapes to some extent the interpretation since translation can only be done within the limits of our own language.
2. Donald Davidson suggests the principle of charity (or, in his words, “the principle of rational accommodation”) should attempt to “maximize” sense and “optimize” agreement when invoked with respect to coherence and factual correspondence of what is said. We should seek a coherent understanding supported by a common base of understanding.
  1. The principle of coherence seeks “logical consistency in the thought of the speaker.”[5] The interpreter is to translate the speaker's discourse so as to accentuate the logical agreement of the speaker's statements with what the interpreter takes the speaker's beliefs to be — not what the interpreter's own beliefs are. The principle of charity recognizes that there is no independent objective viewpoint from which to judge the speakers discourse. Eventually, any objectivity is framed from intersubjectivity of speaker and interpreter.
  2. The principle of correspondence seeks “the same features of the world that [we] would be responding to under similar circumstances.”[6] In practice, this principle can only be an ideal since different states of affairs ofen mean different things to different people when they are experienced from different viewpoints. (E.g., the British tend to be slightly amused at U.S.'s July 4th holiday (U.S.'s 1776 historical independence day), whereas Americans, for the most part, have no awareness of Britian's Guy Fawkes Day which commemorates the failed 1605 Gunpowder Plot.)
  3. Consequently, Davidson's account more or less presupposes a truth-functional theory of meaning of a system of truth-value statements.
3. The humanity principle as put forward by Richard Grandy is that we should initially interpret a different philosophical point of view in accordance with the assumption that the interrelation of belief and reality being expressed is similar to our own.[7] In a similar manner, Donald Dennett explains the principle of humanity, “[O]ne should attribute to [the person's whose view we are attempting to understand] … the propositional attitudes one supposes one would have oneself in those circumstances.”[8] The principle of humanity is intended to perform the same role as the principle of charity.
In many subject areas other than traditional Western thought, the principle of rational accommodation cannot emphasized. Interpretation or translation is context-dependent. In numerous instances of the thought of different cultures including our own, discourse with respect to paradigm change in the sciences, in some domains of Continental philosophy, in poetry and literature, in aesthetics, and in religion, sometimes fidelity of content, imagination, or even empathy is prized over consistency, correspondence and familiar attitudes.[9]

In the following examples, the principle of charity with its features of rational accommodation and the humanity principle seems to be inapplicable to an open-minded interpretation of the ideas in the discourse presented:
1. In fundamental physics, Feynman writes in his Nobel Prize Lecture about struggling with the notion of backward causation in quantum electrodynamics:
  
  “[A]ll physicists know from studying Einstein and Bohr, that sometimes an idea which looks completely paradoxical at first, if analyzed to completion in all detail and in experimental situations, may, in fact, not be paradoxical.”[10]
  
  The topic of retrocausality as well as that of quantum entanglement leads to paradox in rational-thought experiments. The consequences for “rationally accommodating” these proposed phenomena are contrary to our intuitive understanding of the world. So Feynman suspends presumption of the arrow of time and pursues the theoretical consequences as if that belief were the case.
2. In literature, Dostoevsky writes in his Notes from Underground that what is not in one's own interest may be precisely that which is in one's own interest:
  “Who was it first said, first propounded the theory, that man does evil only because he is blind to his own interests, but that if he were enlightened, if his eyes were opened to his real, his normal interests, he would at once cease to do evil and become virtuous and noble … since when, during these thousands of years, has man ever acted solely in accordance with his own interests? … What if human advantage not only may, but does, consist of the fact that, on certain occasions, man may desire, not what is good for him, but what is bad?”[11]
  
  Through consideration of the seemingly contradictory idea that one's advantage can be what might not be in one's actual advantage, Dostoevsky reveals the notion of unconscious motivation.
3. In Hinduism, God may be worshiped as a child when the devotee worships Krishna. A Christian, uncharitably, might be inclined to think Hinduism strange since the baby Krishna is loved as an advocates' own child. Yet, for the Christian, the notion of the Christ Child could be suggested by the application of the principle of humanity in order to help understand this Hindu ideal. Swami Vivekanda writes:
  
  “The next [human representation of the ideal of divine love] is what is known as Vâtsalya, loving God not as our Father but as our Child. This may look peculiar, but it is a discipline to enable us to detach all ideas of power from the concept of God. … [T]he Christian and the Hindu can realize [this idea of God as Child] easily, because they have the baby Jesus and the baby Krishna.”[12]
  
  The similarity of attitude and belief between Christians and Hindus in this regard helps remove difficulty in understanding by persons who share this similar pattern of thought, but may pose a problem for everyday rational understanding by others.
4. In this example from poetry, literary critic [Compton?] Mackenzie is quoted as pointing out that when Percy Bysshe Shelley wrote the poem “To a Skylark” …:
  
  “Hail to the blithe spirit,
  Bird thou never wert,”
  
  …he wasn't asserting the bird did not exist[13] — yet that would be literally what Shelly wrote. Instead, a charitable interpretation would be that Shelly is metaphorically describing the “blithe spirit” as a transcendent quality of delight and song — not an earthly bird of a particular biological species.
  
  English critic R.L. Mégroz noted a century ago, “[T]he dictum attributed to Longinus, ‘Beautiful words are the very and peculiar light of the mind,’ can only be understood when some other than their lexical sense is attached to them.”[14]
5. Art critic J. Nilsen Laurvik explains French impressionist painter Paul Cézanne's art as exhibiting “unflinching, literal-minded adherence to facts” and as “mathematically precise and hence rigorously truthful”:
  
  “[H]is final emphasis [was] on the sub-structure of form. To him a sphere was not always round, a cube always square or an ellipse always elliptical. … [I]f we could dissociate the sense of roundness from the appearance of roundness as did Cézanne, we would find large surfaces of spheroids quit flat. Therein lies the real secret of the art of Cézanne who is the first of realists.”[15]
  
  So, here, in art as well, fidelity of interpretation, and perhaps some sense of empathy for Laurvik's meaning, is to be prioritized over accommodation of rational coherence, empirical correspondence, and similarity of experience.

Notes

[Most links go to page cited]

1. Simon Blackburn writes, “In various versions it constrains the interpreter to maximize the truth or rationality in the subject's sayings.” The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (London, Oxford University Press: 1994), 62.↩

2. For example, in The Enigma of Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1917), Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber, evolutionary psychologists, argue the pervasiveness of cognitive bias as shown by many psychological research studies confirm the theory that people do not reason impartially but instead reason only to justify and convince other their people own beliefs. They argue that reason evolved as a social tool for persuasion and justification. Yet the authors allow that inherent biases of reasoning can diminished through collaborative research and debate. What's at issue here is whether or not all abstract propositional reasoning, as represented for example in logic books, is necessarily reason-giving argument that is personally-biased intentional reflective inference. Importantly, Mercier and Sperber conclude, “[I]n the right interactive context, reason works.” [p.264].↩

3. “The method is not designed to eliminate disagreement, nor can it; its purpose is make meaningful disagreement possible …” Donald Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” (1974) in The Essential Davidson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 207.↩

4. W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: The M. I. T. Press, 1960), 59.↩

5. Donald Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 211. False beliefs are, of course, still possible; the assumption is that “most beliefs are correct [emphasis his].”. Davidson, “Thought and Talk,” in Mind and Language ed., S. Suttenplan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 17. Instead, we would assume the most possible part of the discourse is true, because it is quite possible that most of the locutor's discourse is not the case.↩

6. Donald Davidson. “Three Varieties of Knowledge” in A. P. Griffiths and A. J. Ayer, eds. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 30 (1991), 158.↩

7. Richard Grandy. “Reference, Meaning and Belief” The Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 439-452.↩

8. Donald Dennett, “Midterm Examination: Compare and Contrast” The Intentional Stance (Boston: MIT Press, 1987) 342.↩

9. Fidelity-preserving interpretation might need to abdicate the coherence, correspondence, and humanity requirements in the classical interpretations charity when the interpretation presents empirical absurdities or outright logical contradiction. For example, the anthropologist Lévi-Bruhl writes:

“[I]n the collective representations of primitive mentality, objects, beings, phenomena can be … in a way incomprehensible to us … [T]he opposition between the one and the many, the same and another, and so forth, does not impose upon this mentality the necessity of affirming one of the terms if the other be denied, or vice versa. … [T]he Trumai (a tribe of Northern Brazil) say that they are aquatic animals.—The Bororo (a neighbouring tribe) boast that they are red araras (parakeets).” [How Natives Think trans. Lilian A. Clare (New York: Knopf, 1925), 77.]

Accurate interpretation need reflect such “incomprehensibilities” even though many texts like this one violate both the principles of coherence and correspondence required by the principle of charity. As well, if we follow Davidson's requirement that most any interpreted account is to be considered true, how could psychoanalytical interpretations of the experiences of schizophrenics with prominent paranoid symptoms be charitably be interpreted? [Q.v., Mathieu Frérejouan, “The Myth of Irrationality: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Delusions and to the Principle of Charity,” in (In)coherence is Discourse: Formal and Conceptual Issues of Language, eds. M. Amblard, M. Musiol and M. Rebuschi (Cham, CH: Springer Nature, 2021), 138.]

D..T. Correia and C. Siopa argue that the interpretation of the reports of delusional people, although in most respects irrational, can be interpreted in a similar manner as we interpret our dreams: neither delusions nor dreams are rational, but both experiences have meaning:

“We believe the patient knows herself to be Christ, yet simultaneously that we cannot know her to be so. And this is a characterization of delusion that may be shared both by patient and therapist; it provides a foothold for agreement rather than antagonism.” [Rick Bellaar and Jasper Feyaerts, “Meaning and Delusion” in The Philosophy and Psychology of Delusions: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives eds. A. Falcato and J Gonçalves (New York: Routledge, 2024), 101.]

Just as we can know our conscious life and our dreams so likewise a delusional person can know conscious life and delusions without imposing the same rational standard on both. Many situations exist where we do not share the same rational and empirical norms, nor even the same attitudes as expressed in the discourse presented.↩

10. Richard P. Feynman, The Development of the Space-Time View of Quantum Electrodynamics,” Nobel Prize Lecture, (December 1965) from Nobel Lectures, Physics 1963-1970 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1972).↩

11. Fyodor Dostoevsky, Letters From the Underworld trans. C.J. Hogarth (London: M. Dent & Sons, 1929), 25-26.↩

12. Swami Vivekananda, “Human Representations of the Divine Ideal of Love,” The Complete Works of the Swami Vivekananda 3rd. ed. (Calcutta: Sir Gauranga Press, 1922), III: 95.↩

13. O.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning 2nd. ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1927), 238.↩

14. Quoted by R.L. Mégroz, “The Language of Poetry,” Walter De La Mare: A Bibliographical and Critical Study (London: Hodder and Stoughton: 1924), 196.↩

15. J. Nilsen Laurvik, Is It Art? Post-Impressionism, Futurism, Cubism (New York: International Press, 1913), 6.↩

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Cite Entry October 9 2025 06:55 EDT Class Debate, Carcilse Indian School, 1879-1918 Library of Congress LC-USZ62-47083 Links for Introduction to Philosophical Inquiry Online Home Online Schedule Campus Home Campus Schedule Online Syllabus Textbook Sample Quizzes SampleTests Online FAQ Links Readings Site Map	Introduction to Philosophy The Principle of Charity Abstract: The principle of charity in much of philosophy and the sciences is a presumption whereby preconceptions about an argument, a topic, or a theory are set aside in the attempt to seek an understanding of its most cogent exposition. In other fields of study, the formulation of the principle of charity is often contextually subject-dependent. The Principle of Charity[1] in many areas of the interpretation of discourse is a methodological presumption made in seeking to understand a point of view whereby we seek to understand that view in its best and most cogent form before subjecting the view to evaluation. Often the principle is a means of resolving misunderstanding a speaker's or writer's meaning or ideas while engaged in rational inquiry. The principle of charity is meant to be an integral aspect of interpreting a belief system, point of view, or a standpoint rather than meant as an imposed heuristic principle of rational reconstruction of an opponent's position. (Many criticisms of the traditional principle of charity overlook this prerequisite.) The primary purpose of such a discussion is to seek the the most consistent and true standpoint. While suspending our own beliefs, we seek a sympathetic understanding of the ideas presented. We assume for the moment the ideas are credible even though our initial reaction might be to disagree; we seek to tolerate ambiguity for the larger aim of understanding ideas which might prove useful and helpful. Emphasis is placed on seeking to understand rather than on seeking contradictions or difficulties. Care need be taken to assure key terms are clearly and accurately defined and agreed upon. We seek to understand the ideas in their most convincing form and actively attempt to resolve contradictions. If more than one view is presented, we choose the one that appears the most cogent. However, where possible, the resultant interpretation of the standpoint under investigation must be acknowledged by the speaker as an accurate, fair, and clear re-statement prior to attempted resolution of the issues. The normative use of the principle is meant to apply to discourse where there is a genuine attempt to reach an understanding — and not to persuasive discourse or contests to win an argument or defeat an opponent. In rhetoric, debate, and persuasion, the use of the principle of charity for accurate, fair, and just resolution of differences by reducing the chances of misrepresenting a point of view or committing straw man fallacy has been criticized on the grounds that seeking the most cogent exposition of an opponent's standpoint will likely misconstrue the opposing position. In popular culture the practice of interpreting the most rational and coherent version of an opponents position is often termed a “steel man” interpretation (as opposed to the straw man fallacy which occurs when an adversary's position is misrepresented and then rejected as if it were the argument at issue). One common criticism of the use of the principle of charity is the charge that in being “charitable” the initial standpoint or point of view has been misrepresented because the standpoint's meaning or stated belief has been altered in the re-statement. A related criticism is that the “so called” more rational and cogent “charitable” position is likely to be a case of confirmation bias. The interpreter can be seen as intentionally or unintentionally “misconstruing” the initial standpoint to fit the interpreter's own predispositions.[2] So, what appears to be rational to the interpreter may not seen as rational to the original speaker. Disagreements like these arise because not everyone shares the same understanding of true belief and legitimate rationality. These criticisms are sometimes countered by recognizing that the central purpose of rhetorical, forensic, or persuasive discourse is not intended to be truth-seeking — their intent is to alter attitudes and beliefs. That is, the purpose of rhetoric and persuasion is not to find, evaluate, and understand what is true. In the persuasive arts, rhetoric, as the language art of persuasive speaking or writing, is used not for understanding but for the specific purpose of changing attitudes and beliefs. It's important to recognize that the use of the principle of charity in philosophical discourse was never specifically intended to reach consensus,[3] but to achieve knowledge and understanding. Just as a philosopher is unlikely to be in a position to understand algebraic geometry, so also an irrational person is unlikely to understand what makes a good argument. So, in many fields of controversy, the assumption of something like “equal standing” among disputants might not hold since the disputants might not share a common background of knowledge, a common understanding of rationality, or a belief that inherent bias can be surmounted through open inquiry. Nevertheless, the question of the necessity of “equal standing” for reaching agreement on controversial issues would be an exceedingly difficult precondition to impose for contentious disputes. The principle of charity, in general, is a methodological principle — ideas can be critiqued after achieving an adequate understanding of the author's intent and standpoint. It's important to point out that the original presumption of setting aside our own beliefs and assuming the standpoint at issue is a substantive and provisional step taken prior to evaluation of the point of view under consideration. Hence, we should initially listen or read new material as if we had no preconceptions about the subject. We seek to be open and receptive. This attitude, if maintained, frees the conditioned mind and enables it to absorb and understand the unfamiliar text. In essence, we just start with a simple desire to grasp any points which might not be understood upon first acquaintance. The method is used in the preparation of a transitional understanding for further inquiry and resolution of the text after a preliminary foundation of agreement. Refinements of the principle of charity in philosophy include the principle of rational accommodation whereby we attempt to maximize truth and the principle of humanity where we attempt to maximize intelligibility. Willard Van Orman Quine's version of the principle (in the context of understanding a different language) is this maxim of translation: “[A]ssertions startlingly false on the face of them are likely to turn on hidden differences of languages.” The view under examination is necessarily to be assumed to be mostly true.[4] What this means in practice is our own language shapes to some extent the interpretation since translation can only be done within the limits of our own language. Donald Davidson suggests the principle of charity (or, in his words, “the principle of rational accommodation”) should attempt to “maximize” sense and “optimize” agreement when invoked with respect to coherence and factual correspondence of what is said. We should seek a coherent understanding supported by a common base of understanding. The principle of coherence seeks “logical consistency in the thought of the speaker.”[5] The interpreter is to translate the speaker's discourse so as to accentuate the logical agreement of the speaker's statements with what the interpreter takes the speaker's beliefs to be — not what the interpreter's own beliefs are. The principle of charity recognizes that there is no independent objective viewpoint from which to judge the speakers discourse. Eventually, any objectivity is framed from intersubjectivity of speaker and interpreter. The principle of correspondence seeks “the same features of the world that [we] would be responding to under similar circumstances.”[6] In practice, this principle can only be an ideal since different states of affairs ofen mean different things to different people when they are experienced from different viewpoints. (E.g., the British tend to be slightly amused at U.S.'s July 4th holiday (U.S.'s 1776 historical independence day), whereas Americans, for the most part, have no awareness of Britian's Guy Fawkes Day which commemorates the failed 1605 Gunpowder Plot.) Consequently, Davidson's account more or less presupposes a truth-functional theory of meaning of a system of truth-value statements. The humanity principle as put forward by Richard Grandy is that we should initially interpret a different philosophical point of view in accordance with the assumption that the interrelation of belief and reality being expressed is similar to our own.[7] In a similar manner, Donald Dennett explains the principle of humanity, “[O]ne should attribute to [the person's whose view we are attempting to understand] … the propositional attitudes one supposes one would have oneself in those circumstances.”[8] The principle of humanity is intended to perform the same role as the principle of charity. In many subject areas other than traditional Western thought, the principle of rational accommodation cannot emphasized. Interpretation or translation is context-dependent. In numerous instances of the thought of different cultures including our own, discourse with respect to paradigm change in the sciences, in some domains of Continental philosophy, in poetry and literature, in aesthetics, and in religion, sometimes fidelity of content, imagination, or even empathy is prized over consistency, correspondence and familiar attitudes.[9] In the following examples, the principle of charity with its features of rational accommodation and the humanity principle seems to be inapplicable to an open-minded interpretation of the ideas in the discourse presented: In fundamental physics, Feynman writes in his Nobel Prize Lecture about struggling with the notion of backward causation in quantum electrodynamics: “[A]ll physicists know from studying Einstein and Bohr, that sometimes an idea which looks completely paradoxical at first, if analyzed to completion in all detail and in experimental situations, may, in fact, not be paradoxical.”[10] The topic of retrocausality as well as that of quantum entanglement leads to paradox in rational-thought experiments. The consequences for “rationally accommodating” these proposed phenomena are contrary to our intuitive understanding of the world. So Feynman suspends presumption of the arrow of time and pursues the theoretical consequences as if that belief were the case. In literature, Dostoevsky writes in his Notes from Underground that what is not in one's own interest may be precisely that which is in one's own interest: “Who was it first said, first propounded the theory, that man does evil only because he is blind to his own interests, but that if he were enlightened, if his eyes were opened to his real, his normal interests, he would at once cease to do evil and become virtuous and noble … since when, during these thousands of years, has man ever acted solely in accordance with his own interests? … What if human advantage not only may, but does, consist of the fact that, on certain occasions, man may desire, not what is good for him, but what is bad?”[11] Through consideration of the seemingly contradictory idea that one's advantage can be what might not be in one's actual advantage, Dostoevsky reveals the notion of unconscious motivation. In Hinduism, God may be worshiped as a child when the devotee worships Krishna. A Christian, uncharitably, might be inclined to think Hinduism strange since the baby Krishna is loved as an advocates' own child. Yet, for the Christian, the notion of the Christ Child could be suggested by the application of the principle of humanity in order to help understand this Hindu ideal. Swami Vivekanda writes: “The next [human representation of the ideal of divine love] is what is known as Vâtsalya, loving God not as our Father but as our Child. This may look peculiar, but it is a discipline to enable us to detach all ideas of power from the concept of God. … [T]he Christian and the Hindu can realize [this idea of God as Child] easily, because they have the baby Jesus and the baby Krishna.”[12] The similarity of attitude and belief between Christians and Hindus in this regard helps remove difficulty in understanding by persons who share this similar pattern of thought, but may pose a problem for everyday rational understanding by others. In this example from poetry, literary critic [Compton?] Mackenzie is quoted as pointing out that when Percy Bysshe Shelley wrote the poem “To a Skylark” …: “Hail to the blithe spirit, Bird thou never wert,” …he wasn't asserting the bird did not exist[13] — yet that would be literally what Shelly wrote. Instead, a charitable interpretation would be that Shelly is metaphorically describing the “blithe spirit” as a transcendent quality of delight and song — not an earthly bird of a particular biological species. English critic R.L. Mégroz noted a century ago, “[T]he dictum attributed to Longinus, ‘Beautiful words are the very and peculiar light of the mind,’ can only be understood when some other than their lexical sense is attached to them.”[14] Art critic J. Nilsen Laurvik explains French impressionist painter Paul Cézanne's art as exhibiting “unflinching, literal-minded adherence to facts” and as “mathematically precise and hence rigorously truthful”: “[H]is final emphasis [was] on the sub-structure of form. To him a sphere was not always round, a cube always square or an ellipse always elliptical. … [I]f we could dissociate the sense of roundness from the appearance of roundness as did Cézanne, we would find large surfaces of spheroids quit flat. Therein lies the real secret of the art of Cézanne who is the first of realists.”[15] So, here, in art as well, fidelity of interpretation, and perhaps some sense of empathy for Laurvik's meaning, is to be prioritized over accommodation of rational coherence, empirical correspondence, and similarity of experience. Notes [Most links go to page cited] 1. Simon Blackburn writes, “In various versions it constrains the interpreter to maximize the truth or rationality in the subject's sayings.” The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (London, Oxford University Press: 1994), 62.↩ 2. For example, in The Enigma of Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1917), Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber, evolutionary psychologists, argue the pervasiveness of cognitive bias as shown by many psychological research studies confirm the theory that people do not reason impartially but instead reason only to justify and convince other their people own beliefs. They argue that reason evolved as a social tool for persuasion and justification. Yet the authors allow that inherent biases of reasoning can diminished through collaborative research and debate. What's at issue here is whether or not all abstract propositional reasoning, as represented for example in logic books, is necessarily reason-giving argument that is personally-biased intentional reflective inference. Importantly, Mercier and Sperber conclude, “[I]n the right interactive context, reason works.” [p.264].↩ 3. “The method is not designed to eliminate disagreement, nor can it; its purpose is make meaningful disagreement possible …” Donald Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” (1974) in The Essential Davidson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 207.↩ 4. W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: The M. I. T. Press, 1960), 59.↩ 5. Donald Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 211. False beliefs are, of course, still possible; the assumption is that “most beliefs are correct [emphasis his].”. Davidson, “Thought and Talk,” in Mind and Language ed., S. Suttenplan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 17. Instead, we would assume the most possible part of the discourse is true, because it is quite possible that most of the locutor's discourse is not the case.↩ 6. Donald Davidson. “Three Varieties of Knowledge” in A. P. Griffiths and A. J. Ayer, eds. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 30 (1991), 158.↩ 7. Richard Grandy. “Reference, Meaning and Belief” The Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 439-452.↩ 8. Donald Dennett, “Midterm Examination: Compare and Contrast” The Intentional Stance (Boston: MIT Press, 1987) 342.↩ 9. Fidelity-preserving interpretation might need to abdicate the coherence, correspondence, and humanity requirements in the classical interpretations charity when the interpretation presents empirical absurdities or outright logical contradiction. For example, the anthropologist Lévi-Bruhl writes: “[I]n the collective representations of primitive mentality, objects, beings, phenomena can be … in a way incomprehensible to us … [T]he opposition between the one and the many, the same and another, and so forth, does not impose upon this mentality the necessity of affirming one of the terms if the other be denied, or vice versa. … [T]he Trumai (a tribe of Northern Brazil) say that they are aquatic animals.—The Bororo (a neighbouring tribe) boast that they are red araras (parakeets).” [How Natives Think trans. Lilian A. Clare (New York: Knopf, 1925), 77.] Accurate interpretation need reflect such “incomprehensibilities” even though many texts like this one violate both the principles of coherence and correspondence required by the principle of charity. As well, if we follow Davidson's requirement that most any interpreted account is to be considered true, how could psychoanalytical interpretations of the experiences of schizophrenics with prominent paranoid symptoms be charitably be interpreted? [Q.v., Mathieu Frérejouan, “The Myth of Irrationality: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Delusions and to the Principle of Charity,” in (In)coherence is Discourse: Formal and Conceptual Issues of Language, eds. M. Amblard, M. Musiol and M. Rebuschi (Cham, CH: Springer Nature, 2021), 138.] D..T. Correia and C. Siopa argue that the interpretation of the reports of delusional people, although in most respects irrational, can be interpreted in a similar manner as we interpret our dreams: neither delusions nor dreams are rational, but both experiences have meaning: “We believe the patient knows herself to be Christ, yet simultaneously that we cannot know her to be so. And this is a characterization of delusion that may be shared both by patient and therapist; it provides a foothold for agreement rather than antagonism.” [Rick Bellaar and Jasper Feyaerts, “Meaning and Delusion” in The Philosophy and Psychology of Delusions: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives eds. A. Falcato and J Gonçalves (New York: Routledge, 2024), 101.] Just as we can know our conscious life and our dreams so likewise a delusional person can know conscious life and delusions without imposing the same rational standard on both. Many situations exist where we do not share the same rational and empirical norms, nor even the same attitudes as expressed in the discourse presented.↩ 10. Richard P. Feynman, The Development of the Space-Time View of Quantum Electrodynamics,” Nobel Prize Lecture, (December 1965) from Nobel Lectures, Physics 1963-1970 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1972).↩ 11. Fyodor Dostoevsky, Letters From the Underworld trans. C.J. Hogarth (London: M. Dent & Sons, 1929), 25-26.↩ 12. Swami Vivekananda, “Human Representations of the Divine Ideal of Love,” The Complete Works of the Swami Vivekananda 3rd. ed. (Calcutta: Sir Gauranga Press, 1922), III: 95.↩ 13. O.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning 2nd. ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1927), 238.↩ 14. Quoted by R.L. Mégroz, “The Language of Poetry,” Walter De La Mare: A Bibliographical and Critical Study (London: Hodder and Stoughton: 1924), 196.↩ 15. J. Nilsen Laurvik, Is It Art? Post-Impressionism, Futurism, Cubism (New York: International Press, 1913), 6.↩ Further Reading: “Principle of Charity.” Philosophical and rhetorical principles are briefly summarized by Wikipedia. Charitable interpretation is described as an interpretation in the strongest possible manner while maximizing rationality. “Charity Principles in Philosophical Argumentation,” a paper by R.A.J. Shields, argues that the principle is pragmatic, not just moral or epistemic. He describes and organizes some of the better known forms of the principle of charity. [39 (2025) Argumentation, 83-102.] “Rationality and Charity,” a classic paper by P. Thagard and R.E. Nisbett discusses some of the differing degrees of rigor in foundational interpretations of charity and concludes that there are often empirically justifiable reasons for interpreting arguments to be irrational. They propose a more moderate interpretation of the principle when proposers violate normative standards. [50 (1983) Philosophy of Science, 250-267.] “The Principle of Charity in Philosophy” is discussion on this website of various versions of the principle with examples drawn from various fields of study. The presentation there emphasizes that the principle is a somewhat idealized guide with different purposes in different types of deliberation. “… the principle of charity. This policy calls on us to fit our own propositions (or our own sentences) to the other person's words and attitudes in such a way as to render their speech and other behavior intelligible. This necessarily requires us to see others as much like ourselves in point of overall coherence and correctness — that we see them as more or less rational creatures mentally inhabiting a world much like our own.” Donald Davidson, Problems of Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 35. Relay corrections or suggestions to philhelp@gmail Read the disclaimer concerning this page. 1997-2025 Licensed under GFDL and Creative Commons 3.0 The “Copyleft” copyright assures the user the freedom to use, copy, redistribute, make modifications with the same terms. Works for sale must link to a free copy. The “Creative Commons” copyright assures the user the freedom to copy, distribute, display, and modify on the same terms. Works for sale must link to a free copy.

The Principle of Charity

The Nature of Philosophy

The Principle of Charity

Notes

Further Reading: