Topics Worth Investigating

  1. Does Winslow make a "category mistake"[1] by supposing that the two psychological elements of conscience, feeling and perceiving, are presented as one to consciousness? Can a perception be a feeling or vice versa?

  2. Do moral feelings differ in kind and not just degree from other kinds of feelings? Discuss how this difference in kind might be characterized from Winslow's point of view.

  3. Why do you think Hubbard Winslow believes the conscience is eternal? How is it different from soul? If a person had no conscience, would that person have no soul?

  4. The judgment, "If I can do it, anyone can do it" is sometimes used to rationalize a criticism of another person's actions. Is Winslow's evidence for the existence of the unique associated feelings of pleasure and pain attending to conscience of the same sort of rationalization? In what ways are both arguments flawed?

  5. Explain how Winslow's argument and characterization of "conscience" relies on a fallacy of equivocation involving the term "feeling." Use an unabridged dictionary or a dictionary of psychology to support your explanation.



A category mistake is a confusion of logical types in definition or classification such as "I heard green and saw loud."