Citation Information for “Thomas Aquinas,
‘The Argument from Necessity’”
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and secondary which ought be cited rather than these notes.
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be cited in this manner:
Archie, Lee C, "Thomas Aquinas,‘The Argument from Necessity,’"
Philosophy of Religion (June 26, 2006) URL=<http://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/necessity.shtml>.
“Aquinas believes that a being which exists-of-necessity
cannot be a material individual; cannot have any intrinsic accidental
properties; cannot, therefore, change in any way; and cannot be
an individual of any given species or genus. Hence, an absolutely
necessary being does not have a nature in any straightforward
sense at all. In short, a being which exists-of-necessity cannot be
something whose existence actualises a real potentiality, and each
of the features in this list entails the possession of such a
potentiality.”
Gerald J. Hughes, The Nature of God
(London: Taylor & Francis, 1995), 45.
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