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Baruch Spinoza (Thoemmes)
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Introduction to Philosophy
Baruch Spinoza, "Human Beings are Determined"
Abstract: Baruch Spinoza argues
against the doctrine of free will as a result of demonstrating that
the activity of our minds is equivalent to the activity of our bodies.
The mind is more or less active (or contemplative) in accordance with
the body's activity or sensing.
- Overview of Spinoza's Ethics:
From a number of intuitive definitions, axioms, and postulates,
Spinoza (1632-1677) seeks by means of the geometric method of
proof to understand the essential nature of what is reality
from what he believes to be clear and distinct ideas.
- He views the unity of Nature and God as the only existent
uncaused substance and the necessary and efficient cause of all
other things. Since God is the same thing as Nature, he concludes
by means of Euclid's method of mathematical deduction that mind
and the body are two aspects of the same thing: the connection
among ideas map exactly to the connection among physical entities.
- Everything existing is an aspect of this one substance
which is defined as that which exists “in” itself and is
conceived in terms of itself. Of all of the infinite attributes
(or essence) of this substance, we can know only two: thought (the mental)
and extension (the physical).
- Substance, then, is uncaused and so, in a sense, can also
be thought of as self-caused (the cause of itself or causa
sui). Substance must have already existed as the cause of
itself; thus, substance is not temporally prior to itself —
its eternal. In philosophical jargon, its essence entails its
existence.
- In proposition VII of the Ethics, Spinoza writes,
“Substance cannot be produced by anything external, it
must therefore, be its own cause — that is, its essence
necessarily involves existence, or existence belongs to
its nature.” (Spinoza, Ethics
in The Chief Works of Benedict De Spinoza Vol. II: De
Intellectus Emendatione — Ethica, trans. R.H.M.
Elwes, rev. ed.(London: George Bell and Sons, 1891), 48.)
- Unlike David Hume and other empiricists who distinguish
causal necessity from logical necessity, Spinoza treats
causality as the same thing as logical or absolute necessity.
Hence, he assumes the effects of empirical causes have the same
kind of necessity as that expressed in valid arguments. Thus,
on his view, the laws of nature are logically necessary.
- Just as the conclusion of a demonstrative proof depends
upon its assumptions, so likewise does an effect depend
upon its causes. Just as a proof accounts for its conclusion,
so likewise a causal relations accounts for their effect.
- Thus, the various causal relations among extended physical
entities are viewed as a different modes or modifications of
substance; the logical relations among ideas are, as well,
modes or modifications of substance. The conception and existence
of modes are “in,” i.e., “logically
dependent on” eternal substance, which is
“in-itelf” and not logically dependent upon anything
else other than itself.
- Substance is conceivable in the sense that it can be thought
without contradiction. (Likewise, to know what is
thinkable-without-contradiction is also to know what exists.)
- Substance, or God, known only through its attributes of
thought and extension, necessarily exists. Spinoza states:
“Prop. XI. God, or substance, consisting of infinite
attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite
essentiality, necessarily exists.” (Ethica,
I, Prop. XI).
Scholars dispute whether or not Spinoza refers here to an
infinite number of attributes or refers to each
attribute being infinite. All agree, however, extension and thinking
are the two attributes known to constitute the essence of what
constitutes substance. (Extension and thinking are not
properties per se of substance; they are what are perceived to
be as the essence of substance.)
- So, human beings are aware of two attributes of substance:
extension (essential for matter) and thought (essential for minds).
Ideas and physical entities are modes or modifications of God conceived
respectively either mentally or physically.
- Complete clear and distinct ideas of physical entities would
cohere to form an a priori science of nature — or a
consistent and complete system through which the thought attribute
of God can be known and understood just as the physical entities
themselves cohere to form a causal system of the universe through
which the extended attribute of substance and be known and understood.
(Note, then, that substance does not exist in space in the manner of
19th century science presupposing matter exists in space, for space
is a mode of the attribute extension of substance.)
- In sum, “Whatever is, is in God” (Ethica,
I, Prop. XV). (Again, the word “in” here
denotes “is dependent upon.”)
- All existent things, then, are modifications of God or Nature.
- Minds are understood as modes of God viewed as the attributes
of thought. (Understanding and apprehending are main
characteristics.)
- Bodies are modes of God viewed as attributes of
extension. (The most important quality of bodies or
physical or material entities is that they are extended,
i.e., materially or physically existent things take
up space. Movement and rest are characteristics of
bodies).
- Thusly, Spinoza argues, mind and body are actually
two aspects of one and the same thing.
- Put another way, the mind is the idea of the body, and the body
is constituted of various ideas of the mind.
- Spinoza defines “free” and “necessary” (or
“constrained”) in this manner:
“That thing is called free, which exists solely by the
necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined
by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or
rather constrained, which is determined by something external to
itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action” (Ethica, Definition VII.)
- God, (or Nature, which is the same thing) is
free in the sense that of being self-caused and
self-determining.
- Human beings, however, are constrained in that they are
part of Nature. Man is a modification of Nature or,
what amounts to the same thing, a modification of God.
- And Spinoza goes on to announce “I shall consider
human actions and desires in exactly the same manner, as though I
were concerned with lines, planes and solids.”
(Part
III, Introduction, Ethica, 129.)
- Although we cannot control the effects of physically existent
causes upon us, Spinoza believes from our own nature we have
an essential capacity of insight into knowledge of the
world considered sub specie aeternitatis, i.e.,
the universal, eternal, and necessary knowledge of the essence
of God and of what necessarily follows from his nature.
- It is this knowledge which gives us some measure of freedom: the
ability to regard all external events and their accompanying
affects or emotions in our everyday temporal and subjective
lives with equanimity. In this manner, there is, so to speak,
a diminution of their significance, and attention is directed
“in obedience to virtue”:
”From this third kind of knowledge [of attributes and
essence of God] arises the highest possible mental
acquiescence [peace of mind].” Ethica, V. Prop. XXVII.
In other words, “Acquaint thyself with [God] and be at
peace …” (Job 22:1 The Scofield Reference
Bible: The Holy Bible (1909 New York: Oxford University
Press, 1945) Print).
Spinoza's Ontology: The Nature of What
Exists
†Spinoza's commitment to an infinite number of attributes other than extension and
thinking is disputed by some scholars (see text).
Questions from the assigned
reading:
- The following notes are arranged in response to the questions
(stated below) taken from the chapter reading Baruch
Spinoza, “Part III. On the Origin and the Nature of the
Emotions — Note to Proposition 2.” The Ethics:
Demonstrated in Geometric Order. Translated by R.H.M.
Elwes. London: George Bell and Sons, 1883.
The reading is excerpted as Chapter 19 “Human
Beings are Determined,” available in PDF and HTML, in the
open-source textbook Reading for Philosophical
Inquiry, available in PDF
and HTML.
If you have any difficulty with this reading, use Prof. Jonathan
Bennett's reliable, helpful, and eminently readable version here: Ethics
“Part III, Note on 2,” pp.51-54.
- Explain as clearly as possible Spinoza's two
objections to the belief that human behavior is the result of
the free will of the mind.
- What counter-objection does Spinoza raise
against his view that mental and physical states are merely
coincidental and the mind neither controls the body nor
controls events in the physical world?
- How does Spinoza define "decision" from
the standpoint of thought, and how does he define it from the
standpoint of extension?
- According to Spinoza, why do many persons
believe human beings have free will? How can we become conscious
or discover the causes of our decisions and the unconscious
“appetites” upon which they depend?
- Answers from the reading:
- Explain as clearly as possible Spinoza's two
objections to the belief that human behavior is the result of
the free will of the mind.
- First, Spinoza states that those who believe in free will
are mistaken in their belief that the body does not move
unless the mind is active. As human beings do not know the
causes of their behavior, they are deceived in thinking
themselves free.
- Spinoza replies that experience shows that just as
the mind is more-or-less active or contemplative
so also the body is active and sensing accordingly.
- Hence, physical activities of the body correlate
exactly to the activities of mind. Human actions are
determined by other countless finite modes in accordance
with the causes of nature.
- Second, he contends that the believer in free will is mistaken
in the belief that the mind determines whether or not many
kinds of actions are performed. Just as the body is subject to
nature's laws, so likewise the mind is subject under a
different attribute.
- Spinoza admits human beings are free to the extent
they can substitute some other thought in place of
a given moderate impulse, but he states strong desires
(as in violent emotion) cannot be overcome. He thinks
this “freedom” is consistent with
determinism. Nevertheless, he believes persons are not
free to do or not do some particular thing; as well,
there can be no spontaneity, no any uncaused event.
The “freedom” here referred to by Spinoza
is the successive proximation of the freedom of
self-causedness achieved by reason replacing affect.
- Spinoza writes in Prop. LXVII, “ A free
man in one who lives under the guidance of reason,
who is not led by [emotion] … but who
directly desires that which is good“
(Ethica, 232).
It must be admitted
that Spinoza does not seem to be consistent with
respect to strict determinism here (and, indeed,
in several other passages as well).
- At the conclusion of the Ethics, he
writes:
“If the way which I have pointed
out as leading to this result (i.e., power
over the emotions by which the wise man surpasses
the ignorant man) seems exceedingly hard, it may
nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it be hard,
since it is so seldom found. How would it be
possible, if salvation were ready to our hand,
and could without great labour be found, that it
should be by almost all men neglected? But
all things excellent are as difficult as they are
rare” (Ethica,
270-1).
To preserve any sort of consistency here, Spinoza
must maintain that the “overcoming” of
desires are part of the causal process and, so viewed,
are simply descriptions of human behavior from what
is commonly thought to occur. If so, then Spinoza's
ethical views reduce simply to descriptive
psychological statements.
- In cases where people cannot restrain their impulses,
they think they chose the desired thing by their own free will,
but free decisions of this nature are illusory.
- In every case, the individual is not aware of the causes
of the action, but is only aware of the action, itself.
- Hence Spinoza concludes that appetites, emotions, and
desires vary according to bodily states and, in fact, are
simultaneous with them.
- In this manner, human decisions can be viewed equally
as either an attribute of thought or as an attribute of
extension.
- That we do not have free will of thought is evidenced
by the fact that we cannot freely decide to remember or
forget a so-called idea of the mind. Forgetting or
remembering is, instead, a natural causal process.
- All purported acts of will are deducible from the laws
of Nature.
[Return
to Questions]
- What counter-objection does Spinoza raise
against his view that mental and physical states are merely
coincidental and the mind neither controls the body nor
controls events in the physical world?
- Spinoza rejects the indeterminist's objection
that natural law cannot explain the origin of human art
and construction because cultural artifacts can
only be produced by means of the creativity of human beings.
- He points out that nature produces phenomena far more complex
than human beings could create; indeed, the human body, itself,
far exceeds in complexity anything found in human art.
- From natural causes, infinite results follow. Human beings
are a part of nature just like anything else.
[Return
to Questions]
- How does Spinoza define "decision" from
the standpoint of thought, and how does he define it from the
standpoint of extension?
- A mental decision is regarded under the attribute of
thought is a caused idea.
- A decision as a conditioned state or appetite is
regarded under the attribute of extension.
- A mental decision and a bodily appetite, according
to Spinoza, are the same thing.
[Return
to Questions]
- According to Spinoza, why do many persons
believe human beings have free will? How can we become conscious
or discover the causes of our decisions and the unconscious
“appetites” upon which they depend?
- Spinoza argues that the causes (that which brings
forth the actuality or essence) of human action
are presently unknown.
- He disagrees with the view that the mind
can control the body by means of thought or will
power.
- Spinoza recognizes the ranges of the possibilities
of the functions and activities of all aspects of the
human body cannot be known or explained.
- Thus, Spinoza concludes that the belief that actions
and functions of the human body are activated by
thought or will power is meaningless.
- The notion of free will is ontologically the same sort
of thing as an idea of imagination or memory.
“Decisions” have the same necessity as any
other kind of idea or object of nature.
[Return
to Questions]
Spinoza Further Reading and Links
Spinoza Readings
- “Baruch Spinoza,”
is a strong biography of Spinoza's life by A.S. Pringle-Pattison,
Fellow of the British Academy, from the readable yet scholarly The
Encyclopædia Britannica 11th ed. (New York: Encyclopædia
Britannica, Inc., 1911), XXV: 687-91.
- “Baruch
Spinoza”: This entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
by Spinoza scholar Steven Nadler of the University of Wisconsin
contains a biography and short bibliography together with analyses of
the Ethics and the Theological-Political Treatise.
- “Benedict
De Spinoza”: This article from The Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy summarizes Spinoza's life and works. Spinoza's
Ethics is examined in some detail by Prof. Blake D. Dutton.
- Benedictus de Spinoza, The
Chief Works of Benedict De Spinoza Vol. II: De Intellectus
Emendatione — Ethica, trans. R.H.M. Elwes rev. ed.
(London: George Bell and Sons, 1891).
- “Spinoza”:
A series of lectures by
- The
Philosophy of Benedictus de Spinoza: Rudolf W. Meijer's authoritative
site contains a hypertext edition of Spinoza's Ethics, the
Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, and the Tractatus
Politicus together with a selection of letters, all with useful
internal links.
- Some
Texts from Early Modern Philosophy: Baruch Spinoza”: Jonathan
Bennett provides reliable, modified
PDF versions of Spinoza's correspondence from 1661-1676, Ethics
Demonstrated in Geometrical Order and Treatise on Theology
and Politics which are “faithful to the content …
but plainer and more straightforward” than the original works. If
you seek a cleaner, clearer, and more insightful reading of Spinoza's
Ethics than that of R.H.M. Elwes' translation, Prof. Bennett's
version with his internal commentary will prove to be indispensible.
Spinoza Links
- Charles
Jarrett's Spinoza Links Links to Spinoza sites, associations,
online books, bibliographies, and more.
- A Dedication to Spinoza's
Insights: A wide-selection of topics, introductions, indices, links,
e-texts, notes, and other resources are by Joseph B. Yesselman.
- Spinoza
Kyôkai Web Resources for Spinozists: Extensive links to texts,
online data bases, associations, research websites, and etexts in Latin
and English.
- Studia
Spinoziana. Links to Websites related to Spinoza and 17th and
18th Century Studies by Ron Bombardi of Middle Tennessee State University.
“Spinoza denied free-will, because it was inconsistent with the
nature of God, and with the laws to which human actions are subject. …
There is nothing really contingent. Contingency, free determination, disorder,
chance, lie only in our ignorance. The supposed consciousness of freedom
arises from a forgetfulness of the causes that dispose us to will and desire.
Volitions are the varing appetites of the soul.” Alexander Bain,
Mental Science (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1868), p. 414.
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