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The Principle of Charity in PhilosophyAbstract: The principle of charity is a presumption wherein our own preconceptions regarding most any form of discourse is temporally set aside in the endeavor to secure a coherent, rational, and respectful understanding of the subject prior to its interpretation or evaluation. Various related versions of the principle are described here with illustrative examples. In practice, the principle of charity is a somewhat idealized guide to translate interpret, or understand problematic or difficult discourse involved in a variety of types of deliberation, arbitration, conversation, dialogue, discussion, or argumentation. Contents
A rhetorical approach to a text must concern itself not only with the author's intentions but also with all the features implicated in the text as a persuasive or argumentative use of language: the structure of the text as a means of communication, the nature and response of the audience or reader, the text's relation to other discourses, and the social and political contexts of the interaction between author, text, and reader, as well as a historicist concern with the differences between a modern reception of the text and its original performative conditions. In short, a rhetorical approach views a literary text not as an isolated act (merely recording, for example, the private thoughts of an author) but as a performance in a social context.[2.5] “[1] The neutral analyst [attempts] to avoid both the imposition of his or her own personal values on the analysand and the unquestioning acceptance of the analysand's initial value judgments.” [6]Application of neutrality, as also for charity, is, of course, a goal of a process and not the process itself.
“[T]he content of a sentence often goes beyond the thought expressed by it. But the opposite often happens too; the mere mere wording, which can be made permanent by writing or the gramophone, does not suffice for the expression of the thought … [T]he mere wording, as it can be preserved in writing, is not the complete expression of the thought; the knowledge of certain conditions accompanying the utterance, which are used as means of expressing the thought, is needed for us to grasp the thought correctly.”[4a]Saul Kripke points out any account of beliefs must account for different interpretations of referential and attributive uses — i.e., understanding the statement by its words alone or by its intended contextual reference. where “our normal practices of interpretation and attribution of belief are subjected to the greatest possible strain, perhaps to the point of breakdown. So is the notion of the content of someone's assertion, the proposition it expresses. In the present state of our knowledge, I think it would be foolish to draw any conclusion, positive or negative, about substitutivity.”[4b]
Postscript“The Principle of Charity: If a participant's argument is reformulated by an opponent, it should be carefully expressed in its strongest possible version that is consistent with what is believed to be the original intention of the arguer. If there is any question about that intention or about any implicit part of the argument, the arguer should be given the benefit of any doubt in the reformulation and/or, when possible, given the opportunity to amend it.”T. Edward Damer, Attacking Faulty Reasoning: A Practical Guide to Fallacy-Free Arguments 6th ed. (2005 Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009), 7. Notes1. “In various versions it constrains the interpreter to maximize the truth or rationality in the subject's sayings.” Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (London, Oxford University Press: 1994), 62. doi: 10.1093/acref/9780198735304.001.0001↩ 2. E.g. Michael Scriven, Reasoning (McGraw-Hill, 1976), 72. Also Katharina Stevens, Principle of Charity as a Moral Requirement in Non-Institutionalized Argumentation,” 19 (2020) OSSA Conference Archive, 76. Perhaps, as well, Grice's maxims falling under his Cooperative Principle: H.P. Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” in Syntax and Semantics eds. P. Cole and J. L. Morgan vol. 3 (New York: Academic Press, 1975), 47, or “Logic and Conversation,” in Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1989),28.↩
2. A practical precondition for applying the principle
of charity is sometimes assumed to be that the ideas
or argument under investigation be interesting or have
merit. For example, Ralph H. Johnson urges with respect
to argument evaluation, the passage under examination
should be “(i) a fully expressed argument (ii) from
a serious arguer (iii) on a serious matter.” Ralph
H. Johnson, “Charity
Begins at Home,” Informal Logic Newsletter
3 no. 3 (January, 1984),
4-9. doi:
10.22329/il.v3i3.2791
“When I began reading ‘The 9 Words Parents Should Never Say to Their Kid’ … I was skeptical that essayist Patrick Coleman's point of view would line up with my own, and I wasn't disappointed.” [John Rosemond, “It's OK to Tell Your Kinds the Truth,” Index-Journal 100 no. 6 (March 24, 2018), 7A.]In accordance with Davidson's principle of accommodation, his complete disagreement in belief with advocates of gentle parenting led to an interpretation of ridicule not reflective of Davidson's notion of accommodation: “According to the gentles, children behave badly only because their adult caregivers have failed to ‘connect’ with them in some essential way (e.g., they have failed to treat said children as equals). It is essential to maintain the charade that children are divine beings sent from heaven to grace us with their immaculate presence.” [“It's OK”]On the other hand, given that John Rosemond as a knowledgeable child psychologist had previously charitably studied the gentle parenting viewpoint, he would be free to criticize the view.↩ 2.1. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 22-23. The English courts are in general more restrictive—interpreting statutes in accordance with the literal rule (also termed, “the plain meaning rule”) which adheres to the “black letter of the law.” Lord Esher, writes in 1891, “If the words of the Act are clear, you must follow them even though they lead to a manifest absurdity. The Court has nothing to do the the question of whether the legislature has committed an absurdity.” Lord Esher, M.R., “The Court of Appeal, The Queen v. Judge of City of London Court,” in The Law Reports of the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting: Queen's Bench Division, ed. A.P. Stone, (London: Wiliam Clowes and Sons, Ltd., 1892), I: 290. 2.1a. John Crowe Ransom, The World's Body (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938), 1951), 455.↩ 2.1b. Ransom, 462.↩ 2.1c. Ransom, 463. Also, in poetic criticism, W.K. Wimsatt, Jr. and M.C. Beardsley specifically reject interpretation in terms of the (1) intentional (factors concerning the origin and causes of the composition) and (2) the external affect (factors concerning emotive import or significance). As for the first, “[T]here is no legitimate reason why criticism … should become a dependent of social history or of anthropology”(54), and as for the second: “Vividness is not the thing in the work by which the work may be identified, but the result of a cognitive structure, which is the thing” (italics in the original) (45-46). W.K. Wimsatt and M.C. Beardsley, “The Affective Fallacy” The Sewanee Review 57 no. 1 (Winter, 1949), 31-55. JSTOR↩ 2.1d. Cleanth Brooks, “Wordsworth and the Paradox of the Imagination,”The Well Wrought Urn: Studies in the Structure of Poetry (New York: Harcourt, Inc., 1942), 124.↩ 2.1d''. Archibald MacLeish, Collected Poems, 1917-1982 (Boston: Houghton Miflin Company, 1985), 107.↩ 4a. Gottlob Frege, “Thought,” trans. Peter Geach and R.H. Stoothoff The Frege Reader ed. Michael Beaney (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, Ltd., 1977), 331-332.↩ x. Grandy 1973, 440.↩ 2.1f. Allan C. Hutchinson, It's All in the Game: A Nonfoundationalist Account of Law and Adjudication (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 90. doi: 10.1215/9780822380429>↩ 2.2 Theodore Sedgwick, A Treatise on the Rules Which Govern the Interpretation and Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law (New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1874), 194.↩ 2.2'.Pickett v. United States, 216 U.S. 456, 461 (1910)↩ 2.2a Stanley Eugene Fish, Is There a Text in this Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge MS: Harvard University Press, 1980). 95.↩ 2.2b. Fish, 9.↩ 2.2b'. Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics and Criticism and Other Writings trans. and ed. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 142. doi: 10.1017/cbo9780511814945.006↩ Z.Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method 2nd rev. ed. trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (1975 London: Continuum, 2004), 305.↩
2.2c. Scriven, Reasoning, 72. 2.2d. Hutchinson, 90.↩
2.3. Ronald Dworkin, “A Bigger Victory Than We Knew” The New York Review of Books, 59 no. 13 (August 16, 2012), 6-12.↩ 2.3a. Judge Learned Hand, “The Speech of Justice,” Harvard Law Review 29 no. 6 (March, 1916), 617. doi: 10.2307/1326497↩ 2.4. United States et al. v. American Trucking Associations, Inc. et al. 310 U.S.534, 713 (1940), 543-544 (footnotes omitted). ↩ https://books.google.com/books?id=XH1JenkqXBcC&pg=PA10242.4a. Modernist Studies Association http://msa.press.jhu.edu↩
2.4b. Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: an Introduction
2.4b'. William Wordsworth, The Prose Works of William Wordsworth
ed. Alexander B. Grosart (London: Edward Moxon, Son, and Co., 1876), 94.↩
2.4b'Friedrich Schleiemacher, Hermeneutics and Criticism: And
Other Writings ed. and trans. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 24.↩
2.4c. Sigmund Freud, The
Interpretation of Dreams ed. A.A. Brill (New York: MacMillan,
1913), 123.↩
2.5. Johnson
v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000), 706 (citation omitted).
The early British legal positivist John Austin also takes an
integrative approach in his “Note on
Interpretation”:
2.5a. Roy Schafer, The Analytic Attitude (1983 London: Karnac Books and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1993), pp. in text.↩ 3. W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass: The M.I.T. Press, 1960), 59.↩ 4. Quine, Word and Object, 58.↩ 5. W.V.O. Quine refers to this one short passage of Neil Wilson's paper: “… the Principle of Charity. We select as designatum that individual which will make the largest possible number of … statements true.” [Neil L. Wilson”Substances without Substrata,” The Review of Metaphysics 12 no. 4 (June, 1959), 532. JSTOR]Wilson's version of the principle foreshadows Donald Davidson's principle of rational accommodation: ”We select as designatum that individual which will make the largest possible number of … statements true.” [Donald Davidson, “Three Varieties of Knowledge (1991),” Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 211.doi: 10.1093/0198237537.003.0014]On the whole, then, the principle of charity requires an translation or interpretation maximizing agreement, coherence, or consistency, but not necessarily requiring consistency on any specific statement.↩ 4b. Saul A. Kripke, “A Puzzle About Belief,” Meaning and Use (Dordrecht, Netherlands, D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), 269. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4020-4104-4_13↩ 5. Donald Davidson, “Expressing Evaluations (1984),” in Problems of Rationality (Clarendon Press, 2004), 35. doi: 10.1093/0198237545.003.0002" ↩ 6. Donald Davidson, “Three Varieties of Knowledge,” (1991) in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 221.↩ 7. Donald Davidson, “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge (1983),” Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 150. doi: 10.1093/0198237537.003.0010"↩ 8. Donald Davidson, “A Coherence Theory,” 150. ↩ 8.1 On the principle of charity, we render others intelligible by analogizing from the body of beliefs, desires, and values we ourselves have adopted. 6 If we find that the acknowledged, overriding system for another group bears very little resemblance with respect to substantial content to our own acknowledged, overriding system, we have a problem. If we see the adherents of that other code to be striving after things so different from what we understand ourselves to be pursuing, we might well suspect that we have not understood these people. 11 To attribute massive error to them is to undermine a crucial assumption of interpretation: that they are forming beliefs about the same world we are. 13 David Wong, Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 83. doi: 0.1093/0195305396.001.0001↩ 8a. “Ceteris paribus” or “Other things being equal” implies initially assuming the absence of instances of absurdity, deception, ignorance, or fallibility for the moment as unreliability would become discernible through incoherence and falsity in due time when evaluated.↩ 8b. Davidson writes, ”The methodological problem of interpretation is to see how, given the sentences a man accepts as true under given circumstances, to work out what his beliefs are and what his words mean. Donald Davidson, Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation (1984 New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 162.↩ 8c. E.g., Richard Grandy's pragmatic constraint entitled the principle of humanity that that he thinks improves upon the principle of charity.↩ 8d.Davidson writes, “[T]the Principle of Charity … counsels us quite generally to prefer theories of interpretation that minimize disagreement.” Donald Davidson, Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation (1984 New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), xvii.↩ 9. Donald Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme (1974),” in Truth and Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 197.doi: 10.1093/0199246297.003.0013 ↩ 10. Richard Grandy. “Reference, Meaning, and Belief,” The Journal of Philosophy 70 no. 14 (August, 1973): 439-452.doi: 10.2307/2025108 ↩ 11. E.g, Quine writes, “For certainly, the more absurd or exotic the beliefs imputed to a people, the more suspicious we are entitled to be of the translations …” Word and Object, 69. And Davidson writes, “[T]the Principle of Charity … counsels us quite generally to prefer theories of interpretation that minimize disagreement.” Donald Davidson, Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation (1984 New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). xvii).↩ 12. Daniel Dennett, “Midterm Examination: Compare and Contrast,” in The Intentional_Stance (Boston: MIT Press, 1987). 342-343.↩ 13'. Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig, Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 270.↩ 14. Laurie M. Brown, ed., Selected Papers of Richard Feynman (With Commentary), vol. 27 World Scientific Series in 20th Century Physics (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co., 2000), 12.↩ 14.Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground trans. Constance Garnett in Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Meridian Books, 1989), 67.↩ 15. Quine, Word and Object, 59.↩ 16. Swami Vivekananda, “Human Representations of the Divine Ideal of Love, ”The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda (Partha Sinha, 2019), 583. ↩ 17.Hiam G. Ginnot, Between Parent and Child, rev. Alice Ginott and H. Wallace Goddard (1965 New York: Three Rivers Press, 2003), 8.↩ The Principle of Charity BibliographyMaija Aalto-Heinilä, “Fairness in Statutory Interpretation: Text, Purpose or Intention,” International Journal of Legal Discourse 1 no. 1 (), 193-211. doi: 10:1515/ijld-2016-004 Günter Abel, “Indeterminacy and Interpretation,” Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 no. 4 (1994), 403-419. doi: 10.1080/00201749408602363 Jonathan E. Adler, “Charity, Interpretation, Fallacy,” Informal Logic 29 no. 4 (1996), 329-343. doi: 10.3366/jsp.2016.0114 Jonathan E. Adler, “Why Be Charitable?,” Informal Logic 4 no. 2 (May, 1982), 15-16. doi: 10.22329/il.v4i2.2769 Adam Weller Gur Arye, “Reid's Principle of Credulity as a Principle of Charity,” Journal of Scottish Philosophy 14 no. 1 (2016), 69-83. doi: 10.3366/jsp.2016.0114 Daniel N. Boone, “The Cogent Reasoning Model of Informal Fallacies,” Informal Logic 19 no. 1 (1999), 1-39. 10.22329/il.v19i1.2313 Tracy Bowell and Gary Kemp, Critical Thinking: A Concise Guide 3rd ed. (2002 New York: Routledge, 2010), 56-60. Alan Brinton, “Analysis of Argument Strategies of Attack and Cooption: Stock Cases, Formalization, and Argument Reconstruction,” Informal Logic 17 no. 2 (Spring, 1995), 249-258. doi: 10.22329/il.v17i2.2412 Marí:a Rosario Hernández Borges, “The Principle of Charity, Transcendentalism and Relativism, ” The Proceedings of the Twenty-First Wold Congress of Philosophy 6 (2007), 69-75. doi: 10.5840/wcp2120076186 Anthony Brueckner, “Moore-Paradoxicality and the Principle of Charity,” Theoria 75 no. 3 (2009), 245-247. doi: 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2009.01042.x" Maria Caamaño, “Davidson's Argument for the Principle of Charity,” in Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosopy eds. Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone Chichester, UK: (Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 367-369. doi: 10.1002/9781444344431.ch98 T. Edward Damer, Attacking Faulty Reasoning: A Practical Guide to Fallacy-Free Arguments 6th ed. (2005 Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009), 7, 19-20. Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 27; 101; 136-137; 152-153; 159; 168-169; 196-197; 200-2001. doi: 10.1093/0199246297.001.0001 Donald Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47 (1973-1974), 5-20.doi: 10.5840/apapa2013236Donald Davidson, “Radical Interpretation,” Dialectics 27 no. 3-4 (December 1973), 313-328. doi: 10.5840/apapa2013236 doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.1973.tb00623.x Johathan Davis, “A Code of Conduct for Effective Rational Discussion” A useful summary of twelve principles for open discussion in Usenet debates which is drawn from T. Edward Damer, Attacking Faulty Reasoning 6th ed. (2005 Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009), 7, 19-20. Peter Davson-Galle, “Interpreting Arguments and Judging Issues,&rdquo Informal Logic 11 no. 1 (Winter, 1989), 41-45. doi:10.22329/il.v11i1.2616 Daniel Dohrn, “Interpretive Charity and Content Externalism,”unpublished manuscript Robert Fogelin, “Charitable Reconstruction and Logical Neutrality,” Informal Logic 4 no. 3 (January, 1984), 2-5. doi: 10.22329/il.v4i3.2772 M. Finocchiaro, “Fallacies and the Evaluation of Reasoning,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 18 no. 1 (March, 1981), 13-22. doi: 10.2307/20013887 [Logic/Fallacies folder] Gareth Fitzgerald, “Charity and Humanity in the Philosophy of Language,” Praxis 1 no. 2 (Autumn 2008), 17-29. Yiu-ming Fung, “Davidson's Charity in the Context of Chinese Philosophy,”in Davidson's Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Consructive Engagement ed. Bo Mou (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006), 117-162. doi: 10.1002/9781444344431.ch98 HKUST Institutional Repository Christopher Gauker, “The Principle of Charity,” Synthese 69 no. 1 (October, 1986), 1-25. doi: 10.1007/bf01988284 David Glidden, “Augustine's Hermeneutics and the Principle of Charity,” Ancient Philosophy 17 no. 1 (1997), 135-157. doi: 10.5840/ancientphil199717123 Kathrin Glüer, “The Status of Charity I: Conceptual Truth or A Posteriori Necessity?,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 no. 3 (September, 2006), 337-359. doi: 10.1080/09672550600858320 Nathaniel Goldberg, “The Principle of Charity,” Dialogue (Fall, 2004), 671-683. doi: 10.1017/S001221730000398X Trudy Govier, A Practical Study of Argument (Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2010), 51-51. Trudy Govier, “Uncharitable Thoughts about Charity,” Informal Logic 4 no. 1 (November, 1981), 5-6. doi: 10.22329/il.v4i1.2761 Richard Grandy, “ Reference, Meaning, and Belief,” The Journal of Philosophy 70 no. 14 (August, 1973), 439-452. doi: 10.2307/2025108 H.P. Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” in Syntax and Semantics eds. P. Cole and J. L. Morgan (New York: Academic Press, 1975), 41-58. Moria Gutteridge, “‘First Sit Down and Play the Piano Beautifully …’Reading Carefully for Critical Thinking,” Informal Logic 9 no. 2-3 (Spring-Fall, 1987), 81-91. doi: 10.22329/il.v9i2.2664 H. V. Hansen, “An Informal Logic Bibliography,” Informal Logic 12 (1990), 181. [155-184]. doi: 10.22329/il.v12i3.2611 David K. Henderson, &ldquopEpistemic Rationality, Epistemic Motivation and Interpretive Charity,” ProtoSociology 8-9 (1996), 4-29. doi: 10.5840/protosociology19968/91 David K. Henderson, “The Importance of Explanation in Quine's Principle of Charity in Translation,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 18 no. 3 (September, 1988), 355-369. doi: 10.1177/004839318801800304 David K. Henderson, “The Principle of Charity and the Problem of Irrationality (Translation and the Problem of Irrationality),” Synthese 73 no. 2 (November, 1987), 225-252. doi: 10.1007/BF00484741 David K. Henderson, “Winch and the Constraints on Interpretation: Versions of the Principle of Charity,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 no. 2 (1987), 153-173. doi: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1987.tb01614.x Henry Jackman, “Charity, Self-Interpretation, and Belief,&rdquo: Journal of Philosophical Research 28 (2003) 143-168. doi: 10.5840/jpr_2003_20 Dale Jacquette, “Charity and the Reiteration Problem for Enthymemes,” Informal Logic 18 no. 1 (Winter, 1996), 1-15. doi: 10.22329/il.v18i1.2364 [Logic Syllogism] Ralph H. Johnson, “Charity Begins at Home,” Informal Logic 3 no. 3 (January, 1984), 4-9. doi: 10.22329/il.v3i3.2791 Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair, ”Informal Logic and the Reconfiguration of Logic,” in Handbook of the Logic of Argument and Inference: The Turn Towards the Practical ed. Dov M. Gaggay et al. (Elsevier, 2002), 368-369 [339-396] doi: 10.1016/s1570-2464(02)80010-6 Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair, Logical Self-Defense (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1977), 15, 17, 29, 34, 41, 66. [Textbooks] R. H. Johnson, “The New Logic Course: The State of the Art in Non-Formal Methods of Argument Analysis,” Informal Logic 4 no. 2 (1981), [123-143]. Saul A. Kripke, “A Puzzle About Belief Meaning and Use (Dordrecht, Netherlands, D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), 239-288. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4020-4104-4_13 Daniel Laurier, “On the Principle of Charity and the Sources of Indeterminacy,” in Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution ed. Denis Fisette (Dordrecht: Springer Netherland, 1999), 229-248. doi: 10.1007/978-94-015-9193-5_11 Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig, &lduo;The Justification of the Principle of Charity,” in Donald Davidson Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 198-208. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0018 Marcin Lewiński, “The Paradox of Charity,” Informal Logic 32 no. 4 (2012), 403-439. doi: 10.22329/il.v32i4.3620 Kirk Ludwig, “Rationality, Language, and the Principle of Charity,” in The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 343-362. doi: 10.1093/0195145399.003.0018 J. E. Malpas, “The Nature of Interpretative Charity,” Dialectica 42 no. 1 (1988), 17-36. doi: 10.1111/dltc.1988.42.issue-1 John F. Manning, “What Divides Textualist from Purposivists?,” Columbia Law Review 106 no.1 (January, 2006), 70-111. JSTOR Rita C. Manning, “A More Charitable Principle of Charity,” Informal Logic 5 no. 2 (1981), 20-21. doi: 10.22329/il.v5i2.2752" Randal Marlin, “The Rhetoric of Action Description: Ambiguity in Intentional Reference,” Informal Logic 6 no. 3 (Fall, 1984) 26-29. doi: 10.22329/il.v6i3.2737 Andrew Melnyk, “What Do Philosophers Know? A Critical Study of Williamson's ‘The Philosophy of Philosophy’,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 no. 1 (2010), 297-307. Kathryn J. Norlock, “Receptivity as a Virtue of (Practitioners of) Argumentation,” Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings of he 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation 10 (May, 2013), 1-7. Peter Pagin, “The Status of Charity II. Charity, Probability, and Simplicity,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 no. 3 (September, 2006), 361-383. doi: 10.1080/09672550600868683 Carlo Penco, “Truth, Assertion and Charity,” unpublished (2008), 1-11. Phyllis Rooney, “Commentary on: Kathryn J. Norlock's ‘Receptivity as a Virtue of (Practitioners of Argumentation’,” Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings of he 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation 10 (May, 2013), 1-3. Paul Saka, “Spurning Charity,” Axiomathes 17 no. 2 (July, 2007), 197-208. doi: 10.1007/s10516-006-9000-x" Thomas Schwartz, “Logic and Substance: A Reply to Fogelin,” Informal Logic 4 no. 3 (1981)5. doi: 10.22329/il.v4i3.2774 Michael Scriven, Reasoning (Englewood Cliffs, N,J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1973), 71-72. N. Shanks, “On Davidson's Principle of Charity,” Philosophical Inquiry 3 no. 3-4 (Summer/Fall1981), 167-181. doi: 10.5840/philinquiry198133/410 Neven Sesardić, “Psychology Without Principle of Charity,” Dialectica 40 no. 3 (September, 1986), 229-240. doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.1986.tb01535.x Roy Sorensen, “Charity Implies Meta-Charity,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 no. 2 (March 2004), 290 -315.doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00342.x E. Stein, Without Good Reason: The Rationality Debate in Philosophy and Cognitive Science (Oxford: Clarendon,1996), 24, 112-136, 271, 195. Tom Stern, “‘Some Third Thing’: Nietzsche's Words and the Principle of Charity,” Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47 no. 2 (Summer, 2016), 287-302. doi: 10.5325/jnietstud.47.2.0287 Göan Sundholm, “Brouwer's Anticipation of the Principle of Charity,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society New Series 85 no. 1 (1984), 145-146. doi: 10.1093/aristotelian/85.1.263 Göan Sundholm, “Brouwer's Anticipation of the Principle of Charity,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society New Series 85 no. 1 (1985), 263-276. doi: 10.1093/aristotelian/85.1.263 Paul Thagard and Richard E. Nisbett, “Rationality and Charity,” Philosophy of Science 50 (1983), 250-267. Ted Toadvine, “Hermeneutics and the Principle of Explicablility,” Auslegung 20 no. 2 (June, 1995), 59-75. doi: 10.17161/AJP.1808.9402 Evert Vedung, “Systematic Interpetation and the Principle of Charity,” Informal Logic 21-22. Bruce Vermazen, “General Beliefs and the Principle of Charity,” Philosophical Studies 42 no. 1 (July, 1982), 111-118. doi: 10.1007/BF00372844 Timothy Williamson, “Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Knowledge,” The Philosophical Quarterly 55 no. 219 (April 2005), 213-235. doi: 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00396.x Timothy Williamson, “Philosophical ‘Intuitions’ and Scepticism about Judgement,” Dialectica 58 no. 1 (June 2005), 109-153 doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2004.tb00294.x David Wong, Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 83. doi: 0.1093/0195305396.001.0001 Chuang Ye, “The Limit of Charity and Agreement,” Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3 no. 1 (March, 2008), 99-122. doi: 10.1007/s11466-008-0007-9 |
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