Abstract: The Fallacy of Accident, Fallacia
Accidentis, Neglecting Qualifications, and related fallacy
examples are provided and analyzed for credibility in a self-scoring quiz.
Fallacy Practice Directions:
(1) These examples are challenging, so if you do
not already have a good understanding of the varieties of the fallacy
of accident, study the features of the fallacy from the webpage:
Fallacy of Accident: Fallacia
Accidens.
The Fallacy of Accident: the logical error committed when a commonly accepted generalization is claimed to prove
a specific case which is not a proper instance of that generalization.
OR
Neglecting Qualifications: the logical
error committed when a statement with certain term or phrase is claimed to
prove to another statement with the same term or phrase qualified differently.
(2) Read and analyze the following passages.
(3) Explain with a sentence or two as to whether or
not you judge the fallacy of accident to be present.
Check your answer.
Fallacy of Accident Example Exercises
The Roman Stoic philosopher Seneca advances this argument for the
existence of the gods:
“[The] fact that all men agree upon something is a proof of its
truth. For instance, we infer that the gods exist, for this reason, …
that there is implanted in everyone an idea concerning
deity.”[1]
Here's a translation of this argument into a more convenient form:
Whenever persons agree on something, that is a proof of its truth. All persons have an innate idea of the gods.
This proves the gods exist,
Is Seneca claiming that the conclusion is a proper instance of the
general premise? Is his claim the phrase “the gods exist”
is a proper instance of the generalization of “whatever people
agree upon …”?
Seneca appears to proceed logically from a general premise to a specific
instance, but the argument is not a fallacy of accident.
The conclusion of his argument that gods exist is not an exceptional instance
of the generalization that whatever all agree upon is true as it would have
had to be if the accident fallacy occurs.
Instead, the informal fallacy
is ad populum: i.e., simply because most people
believe something is true does not prove that the belief is thereby true.
(Seneca's argument is formally valid, but also is formally
unsound since both the premises are false.)
Consider this argument given by Minot J. Savage, a Unitarian minister:
“I am aware that it is quite a popular American notion
that we are all born free and equal. … Men are not
born free. They are born bound and limited by a thousand
conditions. They are not born equal. … [T]here are not
only these differences of natural ability with which we
start in life, but there is the difference which comes from
the development of these faculties, the acquired training.”[2]
Has Savage proved that the generalization that we are all born free and
equal? Does the crucial term or phrase at issue reflect “the neglect
of qualifications?
Even though people are said to be created equal from a moral or political
point of view, it does not logically follow that people are created equal
in other aspects. The fallacy of accident in this example is the mistake
of confusing the implicit meaning of equal rights of all individuals in the
general premise with equal abilities and equality of outcomes of individuals
in the particular conclusion.
The passage is also an example of quoting out of context as the
clause “all men are created equal” is taken from
the second paragraph of the U.S. Declaration of Independence, a
clause followed by series of phrases listing the senses of equality
meant.[3]
Some general statements have the implicit qualification of the time,
place, or circumstance in which they are expressed.
Evaluate the following seventeenth century advice from John Locke as
if the advice were to be given today:
“[N]o man can pass for a scholar that is ignorant of the
Greek tongue.”[4]
If a Greek teacher today were to quote this statement in an effort to
attract more students, would a fallacy ensue?
If Locke's advice were to be given today, the fallacy of accident would
be said to occur since the generalization is relevant to the time and
circumstances in which it was written. The advice that all scholars
should know Greek was stated absolutely without qualification, but today
that advice is an exceptional or atypical recommendation.
Evaluate the following viewpoint presupposing an inference using a religious
law for a political purpose:
“The Ten Commandments prohibit theft and envy, the pillars of
socialism — using political power to seize and redistribute
private property — which the highly politicized left-wing crowd
so loves.”[5]
Does the accident fallacy occur in this editorial expression of opinion?
The fallacy of accident occurs since the religious generalization is
being applied in an atypical instance. The government's right of eminent
domain, the power of the government to take private property and convert
it for public use, is not a typical circumstance of religious law.
Evaluate the following argument:
“[T]o intentionally kill a fellow-man is murder: therefore
the hangman is a
murderer.”[6]
Does the argument commit the fallacy of accident or does the cogency of the
argument depend upon a verbal issue?
On the one hand, the fallacy of accident can be said to occur if one
accepts the judgment that murder is the illegal taking of life. Since
the hangman is legally justified in the taking of life, then no murder
is committed. So, if the legal intentional taking of life is not murder,
capital punishment is not a relevant instance of “murder,”
and thus the fallacy would occur.
On the other hand, if murder is defined as “any kind of intentional
taking of life is murder, legal or illegal,” then no fallacy would
occur. So whether of not the fallacy occurs in this argument depends on
whether the passage relies on a tacit general rule predicated on the truth
of a proper definition of murder.
This example illustrates the error of attempting to arrive at factual
conclusions by merely framing or examining definitions.
In Lewis Carroll's Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, the
Pigeon declares that Alice cannot be a little girl since he has never
seen any little girl who resembles her:
“‘I-I'm a little girl,’ said Alice.
‘A likely story indeed!’ said the Pigeon in
a tone of deepest contempt. ‘I’ve seen a good many little girls
in my time, but never one with a neck like
that!’”[7]
Does the Pigeon commit the fallacy of accident, or does the Pigeon commit
the fallacy of converse accident (i.e.
the fallacy of considering two few cases or certain exceptional cases and
generalizing to a rule that fits them alone — the opposite of the
specific fallacy of accident)?
The pigeon is reasoning from the inductive generalization about the necks of
little girls, and since Alice does not have a neck like those, the pigeon
concludes that Alice is not a little girl.
So, first, the pigeon's reasoning is all little girls have a certain kind
of neck, Alice does not have a neck like that; thus, Alice is not a little
girl. The fallacy of accident occurs even though the major premise in the
quoted passage is false. In this argument, the error is the Pigeon's
mistaken ascription of an essential property of little girls. Consequently,
the fallacy of accident is committed.
Second, note as well, the Pigeon arrived at the major premise generalization
of the mistaken view of little girls from an examination of too few instances,
so the converse accident implicitly occurs as
well.
The following syllogism purports to show that rhetoric should not be
used:
“That art ought to be proscribed which is employed against
justice and virtue: But Rhetoric is employed against justice and
virtue; Therefore Rhetoric ought to be
proscribed.”[8]
(1) Does the syllogism commit the fallacy of
accident? If so,explain how it does so.
(2) If not, and if you have studied syllogisms, set up the
argument in standard form and order and test for validity.
(1) If the second statement, the minor premise, is taken as a
generalization, the fallacy of neglecting qualifications occurs. In
the minor premise “rhetoric “ refers only to the kind
of rhetoric used against justice and virtue, but in the conclusion,
all rhetoric (not just that kind which is used against
justice and virtue) is being presumed. Consequently, the argument
confuses a qualified statement (i.e., the unworthy use of
rhetoric) with an unqualified statement (i.e. all of rhetoric,
both worthy and unworthy).
From the statement that only the kind of art used to deny justice and
virtue should be banned, the conclusion is drawn that all rhetoric,
whether rhetoric for or against justice and virtue, should be banned.
But not all uses of rhetoric are used against justice and virtue. The
best that the premises prove is that only the unworthy uses of rhetoric
should be disallowed.
This example doesn't fit the schema of the most common definition of
the accident fallacy since an qualified statement is used to lead to
an unqualified statement. Possibly it can be considered an unusual
variety of converse accident.
(2) If we take the minor premise of this argument to be universal,
where all uses of rhetoric is understood to be the subject term, then
this syllogism in standard form argument would be something like this:
All uses of art employed against justice and virtue are imaginative
expressions to be proscribed. Some uses of rhetoric are uses art employed against justice
and virtue. ∴ All uses of rhetoric are imaginative expressions to be
proscribed.
The fallacy of the undistributed minor occurs — the argument is
not valid.
However, the best course of analysis of this argument is to use the
principle of charity to translate the
conclusion as “Some uses of rhetoric are imaginative
expressions to be proscribed.” This syllogism tests valid.
Can you spot the fallacy in this chain of reasoning first written
before the year 1600?
“Whoso drinketh well, sleepeth well,
Whoso sleepeth well, sinneth not,
Whoso sinneth not, shall be blessed:
Ergo, whoso drinketh well shall be blessed.”[9]
A chain of (categorical) syllogisms, the conclusion of each
forming a premise of the next [syllogism]. All conclusions except
the last are suppressed.
Rudolf Allers, “Sorites,”
Dictionary of Philosophy (Patterson, N.J.: Littlefield
Adams, 1962), 296.
the fallacy of accident occurs since the reasoning is
from the generalization that much drinking leads to sleep in the first
premise to the final conclusion about drinking in an atypical or unusual
sense. Specifically, the argument is a false cause of the variety of
fallacia a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid
(arguing from a generally true unqualified premise about drinking to a
final conclusion about drinking intended to be taken in an other than
obvious or literal interpretation).
Render the following sentence fragment into an argument:
”[A]s if a traitor should argue from the sixth commandment,
Thou shalt not kill, to prove that he himself ought not be
hanged.”[10]
Is the argument fallacious? If so, what is being presumed to make it
so?
The hypothetical premise “Thou shalt not kill” is
treated as a generalization which refers to the unlawful or
unjustified killing of human beings — its meaning is
misconstrued in the hypothetical conclusion to refer to an
entirely different example. The taking of a human life described
in the conclusion is different since it is (presumably) an
instance of the lawful justified taking of life.
However, with the abolitionist ethical presupposition that
all killing is immoral, the hanging of a traitor would
be unjustified, lawful or not.
In Shakespeare's Henry VI, Clarence, in disbelief,
is told by assassins his brother sent them to take his life:
“Clar. It cannot be, for
he bewept my fortune,
And hugg'd me in his arms, and swore with sobs
That he would labour my delivery.
First Murd. Why so he doth when he delivers you
From this earth's thraldom to the joys of
heaven.” (R3 1.4.249-254)[11]
Although the reason provided by the first assassin for Clarence's
brother's command is tongue-in-cheek, what is the fallacy the first
assassin commits?
The first murderer implicitly commits the fallacy of accident by
turning Clarence's litany of examples of his brother's love
into the atypical example that the brother loves him so
much he is dispatching him to heaven. Nevertheless, “the
argument” is, by all means, in jest.
In the following passage, Hamlet asks a grave digger who is to be
buried in the grave being excavated. The grave digger responds by
using qualified (legal) senses of the words “man” and
“woman.”:
Ham. What man dost thou dig it for?
Clo. For no man, sir.
Ham. What woman then?
Clo. For none neither.
Ham. Who is to be buried in’t?
Clo. One that was a woman, sir;
but, rest her soul, she’s dead.
Ham. How absolute the knave is! We
must speak by the card, or equivocation will undo us.”
(Ham.
5.1.141-7)[12]
How can this exchange be related to the fallacy of accident?
The grave digger answers Hamlet's inquiry in an absolutist sense that
a corpse is what used to be a human being but is not one now,
whereas Hamlet's understanding of the words “man” and
“woman” is in an unqualified sense. Since no argument is
present, no fallacy occurs. If the grave digger were to defend his use
of the term “woman” by the following argument, the fallacy
of accident would occur:
All living persons are men or women. No grave preparations are for living persons.
No grave preparations are for men or women.
The ambiguity of the phrase “men or women,” exploited by
the grave digger, is the same as typical instances in the fallacy of
neglecting qualifications or fallacy of accident.
Does the author of the following argument prove that a nation's
financial superiority does not ensure victory in war?
“[Machiavelli argues] ‘Money is not the sinews of war,
as is according to the commonly held opinion.’ … If
money is the sinews of war, then financial superiority must ensure
victory; yet striking examples — two ancient and two modern
(plus one very recent) — show that financial superiority does
not always ensure victory; therefore, money is not the sinews of
war.”[13]
Is the argument fallacious?
The answer to this question depends on the meaning of the statement
“Money is the sinews of war.” If the meaning is the
soft generalization …
Superior financial resources are significant for victory in war.
… then the exceptions alluded to do not disprove the judgment
since they are so few.
However, if the meaning of generalization at issue is taken to be
absolute, universal, and without exception, then the examples alluded
to would constitute a falsification of the judgment.
Environmental philosopher Donald Maier rejects the following argument:
Exotic species of plants are harmful because they damage
biodiversity.
Exotic plant kudzu, imported into the southeastern U.S., reduces the diversity of native plants.
Therefore, kudzu is harmful.[14]
Maier states the argument commits the fallacy of accident since
the argument overlooks important additional evidence, the positive
qualifications of kudzu's control of erosion and absorption of
toxins. In other words, Maier maintains kudzu is an exception to
the empirical generalization that exotic species of plants are
harmful, and the argument commits the fallacy of accident.
Do you agree with Maier's assessment?
Whether of not the fallacy of accident occurs in this argument
depends upon the consideration of all relevant evidence
both positive and negative. The soft generalization “Exotic
species of plants are harmful” does not exclude the possibility
that some exotic species are not harmful, and Maier argues that
the factors of kudzu's control of erosion and absorption of toxins
are sufficient to regard kudzu as an exceptional case of the
generalization. However, Maier, himself, neglects this important
additional evidence:
“Kudzu causes damage to powerlines, and even overwhelms
homes … The total area infested by Kudzu is larger than
the state of Vermont … Kudzu diffuses throughout the
forest ground and inhibits the natural process of tree renewal,
preventing the growth of young hardwoods and killing off other
plants. Kudzu out-competes brush and indigenous plants, which
in turn diminishes vital food and habitat resources for wildlife.
… Kudzu's economic impact is
enormous.[15]
The fallacy of accident does not occur in this example since the
effects of biodiversity damage alone is far more significant than
erosion control and absorption of toxins.
Using the schema of the fallacy of accident, can you suggest a solution
to the following classic sophism?
Epimenides the Cretan says that all Cretans are liars. But
since Epimenides himself is a Cretan, it follows that he is
lying. Therefore it is not true that all Cretans could be
liars.
Hint: treat Epimenides's statement as a soft generalization.
If we interpret the premise “All Cretans are liars” to
mean “All Cretans generally lie,” then it
would not follow that Epimenides is lying on this occasion. Indeed,
if we recognize that a liar, by definition, is not someone who
always lies then even if Epimenides generally lies, it
does not necessarily follow that he is lying on this occasion. John
Keynes provides additional other solutions to this
sophism.[16]
A lawyer wrote to a newspaper editor wondering why if public voters
have a secret ballot popular elections, shouldn't Senators in
government also have the same practice. The editor put his argument
in syllogistic form in order to check its validity:
“All those who vote should be protected by secrecy. Senators are those who vote.
Senators should be protected by
secrecy.”[17]
Assuming the editor knows some logic, how do you think the editor
evaluated this argument?
The editor replied as follows:
“This is clearly a four-term fallacy, for the ambiguity
in the middle term makes of it actually two different middle
terms. The middle term — the one which relates the three
propositions logically — is ‘those who vote.’
… The elector who votes at the polls is responsible only
to himself — he is sovereign; the Senator, being the
chosen representative of the sovereign voter, is responsible to
the voter, and the way he votes in the Senate ought to be made
known to the voter who elects
him.”[18]
Thus, the phrase “those who vote” when referring to
Senators are “persons who vote in the Senate,” whereas
the phrase “those who vote” when referring to the public
are “those who vote in a public election.” Since these
are different kinds of voting in different elections under different
circumstances, the argument commits the fallacy of specific
accident (reasoning from a unique case to a different unique case).
10. John Andrews,
A
Compend of Logick (Philadelphia: Budd and Bartram, 1801),
123.↩
11. Also here: William Shakespeare, Richard
III The Annotated Shakespeare ed. A.L.Rouse
(New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1978),
II:235.↩
12. Also here: William Shakespeare, Hamlet,
The Annotated Shakespeare ed. A.L.Rouse (New York:
Clarkson N. Potter, 1978),
III:256.↩
13. Jérémie Barthas, “The
Political Economy of Machiavelli's Discourses,”
in Machiavelli's Discourses on Livy. New Readings ed.
Diogo Pires Aurélio and Andre Santos Campos (Leiden: Brill,
2022), 240, 241.↩
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