Free Will and Determinism: Some Varieties

Philosophical Ethics

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September 18 2025 23:59 EDT

The Philosopher
Antonio da Trento, 1530-50
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Library of Congress
LC-DIG-ppmsca-18682

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Free Will and Determinism: Some Varieties

Abstract: Some of the common philosophical and theological doctrines concerning the extent to which persons have choices are briefly outlined and discussed as a precursor and a background to our study of ethics.

1. Introduction: Historically the morality of peoples has been, for the most part, been based on cultural structure and religious doctrines. Moral values have differed among various persons and groups of persons, in part, due to different political and religious inculcation.
   
   
   1. If there is to be a philosophical basis for how we ought to lead our lives and seek a good life, then this basis cannot be founded on the practices found in different cultures. Morals are based on the ideal behavior practiced among persons in various sociological groups and so is considered a descriptive study of the proper way to think and act. In philosophical ethics, we are interested in the question of how we should act, regardless of how we actually do behave. Hence, ethics is considered a prescriptive study of the proper way to act. The distinction between prescriptive ethics and descriptive ethics or morals is explained in more detail in the tutorial entitled Morals, Ethics, and Metaethics. The difficulties with moral relativism are explained in more detail in the tutorial entitled Ethical Relativism.
      
      
   2. If there is to be a philosophical basis for how we ought to lead our lives and seek a good life, then this basis probably cannot be founded on the existence God either. As we have seen, both a priori and a posteriori proofs for God's existence are subject to substantial philosophical objection — ethical principles cannot be reliably based on such speculation. As well, different religions, of course, derive different ethics principles.
      
      
   3. Thus, our task in this part of the course is to see how far we can base ethical principles on reason alone. Toward this end, it is important to mention as a starting point that if scientific determinism were true (viz that every event has a cause) and psychology were to be a science with exact predictability, it's quite possible the whole enterprise of ethics would be moot. Without the possibility of some free decisions, alternative courses of decision or action would not be possible.
      
      
2. The philosophical positions on the problem of free will and determinism have been many and various. In these notes, ten basic doctrines will be defined, characterized, and outlined. These doctrines are defined in their basic forms; in practice, philosophies utilizing these views are considerably more sophisticated than the accounts sketched here.
   
   
   1. Determinism (hard or scientific): the philosophical view that all events (including mental events) have a cause. In other words, all states of affairs, both physical and mental, are conditioned by their causes and are describable by scientific law.
      
      
      1. In a deterministic universe, there is no free will, no miracles, and no chance events. Sometimes mental events or "choices" are considered epiphenomena. That is, thoughts and feelings are caused events, but do not have causal connection with the world at large. Mental events are byproducts of physical processes.
         
         
      2. The classic view of determinism was expressed by Laplace. Given sufficient knowledge of every particle in the universe, any future event or past event could be calculated with exactitude.

         “If we imagine an intellect which at any given moment knew all the forces that animate Nature and the mutual positions of the beings that comprise it — if this intellect were vast enough to submit its data to analysis — could condense into a single formula the movement of the greatest bodies of the universe and that of the lightest atom. For such an intellect nothing could be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes.” [Pierre-Simon Laplace, Philosophical Essays on Probability (New York: Springer-Verlag), 1995.]

         So, for Laplace, the notion of free will is an illusion.
         
         
      3. D. O. Hebb writes, “Modern psychology takes completely for granted that behavior and neural function are perfectly correlated, that one is completely caused by the other. There is no separate soul or lifeforce to stick a finger into the brain now and then and make neural cells do what they would not otherwise. Actually, of course, this is a working assumption only … It is quite conceivable that someday the assumption will have to be rejected. But it is important also to see that we have not reached that day yet: the working assumption is a necessary one and there is no real evidence opposed to it. … One cannot logically be a determinist in physics and biology, and a mystic in psychology.” The Organization of Behavior: A Neuropsychological Theory (Psychology Press, 2005), xiii.
         
         
   2. Determinism (soft): the philosophical view (sometimes termed compatibilism) that all physical events are caused but mental processes are uncaused. Choices have only to do with mental processes per se which are themselves caused. But the will is said to be free when our actions are caused by mental processes such as intention and desire.
      
      
      1. Consider why one sees a movie twice or watches an instant replay on TV. We do not do so in order to see a different outcome, but we do so as a result of interest and active perception. When what we think we should do, we actually do, we are said to be free; when we do what we do not think we should do, we are not free.
         
         
      2. Even though our internal mental states, desires, or intentions are themselves caused, free will is defined by the soft determinist whenever the outcome of a choice is solely caused by our internal mental state and not caused by external factors.
         
         
      3. Consider also the stoic doctrine that we should distinguish those things in our control from those outside of our control and be concerned only with those things in our control. On this view, what we can control is not what happens in the external world but how we think about what happens in the external world. Our choices are often restricted to “willing the next moment in spite of its inevitability” or simply to be willing to “let it be.”
         
         
      4. So, in a sense, free will is compatible with determinism when our own caused mental actions of choosing are successfully accomplished in the world and not by external forces in the world. “Free” actions are those caused by our own caused choices. Our actions which are caused by external events are not free.
         
         
   3. Predeterminism: the philosophical and theological view that combines God with determinism. On this doctrine events throughout eternity have been foreordained by some supernatural power in a causal sequence.
      
      
      1. If world-events are predetermined, there is no free will, no miracles, and no chance events.
         
         
      2. The metaphor of God constructing and winding up a clock (the universe) and letting it run until the end of time is often used. Presumably, on some accounts, God could step in and adjust the clock and so a miracle (a violation of natural law) would occur.
         
         
      3. However, strictly speaking, the admission of the occurrence of miracles in a predeterministic universe would be an inconsistent belief.
         
         
      4. So, predeterminism holds that every single event is inevitable, fixed, and somehow pre-established. It's determinism pre-arranged, by God, by fate, or by nature, and no one has the ability to change any event.
         
         
   4. Fatalism: the philosophical and sometimes theological doctrine that specific events are fixed in advance (either by God or by some unknown means) although there might be some free play in minor events.
      
      
      1. Fatalism does not presuppose causality, but it is compatible with choice with respect to some events and is also compatible with the existence of miracles. The idea is that major events such as birth, death, major discoveries, and so forth will happen regardless of causes or chance. “What will be, will be, and there is nothing we can do about it.”
         
         
      2. On one view of fatalism, only major events are fixed; minor events have some free play. For example, suppose, for example, by means of some kind of revelation I learn that I will die from burns at 10:02 AM in the local Mercy Hospital on Saturday morning. On the one hand, suppose as soon as I learn this, I get in my car to get to the airport to get as far away as possible, but on the way to the airport, my car is hit by a tanker and I suffer intense heat. After being transported to the hospital, I linger on and then die at the appointed time. On the other hand, suppose I did not take the risk of traveling to the airport and go home and intend to stay under the bed until Sunday. Unknown to me, however, there was a wiring fault in the house, and the house catches fire and so on. I would have choices in such a situation, but the fated event would occur anyway.
         
      3. Strictly speaking, fatalism does not imply predeterminism or determinism — the belief only holds that some or all occurring events are inevitable occurrences. Yet, in a sense, if hard determinism is true, it can be said, that all events would be predetermined and all events would be fated since all three points of view would empirically coincide in such a world.
         
         
   5. Indeterminism: The philosophical doctrine that denies determinism is true. More specifically, not all events (either mental or physical) are determined by past events.
      
      
      1. One type of indeterminism is that a certain amount of free play occurs between events; this free play might be due to chance, free choice, miracle, or chaos. Under this view, some events are caused, and some events are not caused.
         
         
      2. Hence, indeterminism allows for free will, miracles, laws of nature, causality, chance, and chaos.
         
         
      3. Indeterminism is only the view that some events are not caused. In an indeterministic universe, events could not always be reliably predicted by deterministic science.
         
         
   6. Chance (a priori): the philosophical view that the probability of a future occurrence can be calculated from the principles of mathematics alone without empirical evidence.
      
      
      1. For example, it's often said a coin toss results in an equal chance of resulting in a heads or tails. But empirically, such an outcome is highly unlikely. For there to be equal probability of outcomes an “ideal coin” would have to be imagined — a coin with no width (so that it could not land on its side), no head or tails to alter its center of gravity, a completely random force of flipping, and well as countless other idealizations.
         
         
      2. So an a priori chance outcome is a result of formal reasoning without an specific empirical input as to initia determining empirical conditions. It's an idealization of the possible outcomes of an event based on logic or mathematics alone.
         
         
   7. Chance (a posteriori): the philosophical view that the probability of a future occurrence can be calculated from past observations of previous similar occurrences.
      
      
      1. The a posteriori view of chance is wrapped up the intractable problem of induction. For example, we would base the prediction of a coin toss on data derived from past coin tosses of the same coin and tossing mechanism. Over time the odds of such a toss would vary as the environmental conditions of the experiment vary: the temperature, relative humidity, wind velocity, wear on the coin, the purity and density of the coin, the different forces of the flipping mechanism, and so on.
         
         
      2. The notion of chance is not necessarily incompatible with determinism since it might be that the lack of exact initial conditions results in unpredictable behavior. [C.f. Chaos Theory.] In this sense, the outcome of an event cannot be known because of our ignorance of the exact initial conditions of a phenomenon. For example, if one knew the exact shape, mass, geometry, center of gravity of a coin, and the exact amount and direction of force applied, and the relative humidity, wind velocity, and so forth, according to the determinist, in principle, an exact predication of heads or tails could be made. But no measurements can be practically made with such exactitude.
         
         
   8. Free will: the philosophical or theological doctrine that some of our choices are uncaused and effective.
      
      
      1. Free will results from the absence of causes, conditions, or other necessary determinations of choice or behavior. The usual definition of this term in philosophy is not affirmative but negative.
         
         
      2. Note that so-called spontaneous people are persons who do not necessarily exercise free will. Their behavior is often prompted by random proximate causes. Free will implies that an individual has the ability to choose and act in such a way that their behavior is not caused, predetermined, or fated. Some choices are made by "self-initiated" causes without causative prior events. Note, here, the similarity of the notion of free will with the notion of a miracle (i.e. an uncaused event).
         
         

• Causal Determinism. Carl Hoefer explains different definitions of determinism, whether we can know if the universe is deterministic, and the role of determinism in physics. Probability and the question of choice are also discussed in this article from the .
  
  
• “Free Will and Determinism” The philosophical history of the free will debate is traced through Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, Augustine, Aquinas, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Hume, Kant, Bradley, Schlick, and Cambell by Bernard Berofsky in the Dictionary of the History of Ideas maintained by the Electronic Text Center at the University of Virginia Library.
  
  
• “Free Will in Theology” Austin Farrer retraces the history of the free will problem through the Sophists, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, Augustine, and Kant. The linguistic approach to the free will–determinism issue is also discussed in this entry from the Dictionary of the History of Ideas maintained by the Electronic Text Center at the University of Virginia Library.
  
  
• “Determinism in Theology: Predestination” A summary discussion of the logical problems including the dilemma of the problem of evil in both the Christian and non-Christian traditions is presented by Robert M. Kingdon in the Dictionary of the History of Ideas maintained by the Electronic Text Center at the University of Virginia Library.